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Emergencies and disasters are political events, and can often become political 
crises for elected and appointed officials. Current scholarship suggests that five key tasks 
for political officials allow them to manage these crises: sensemaking, decision making, 
meaning making, terminating, and learning. These practices provide a solid foundation 
for political leaders during crises, but it is argued in this thesis that this approach is 
limited wholly to prescriptive recommendations, and that it does not include a realistic 
and descriptive understanding of how political leaders actually respond to crises. The key 
distinction is that political leaders must balance the perception of their effective 
governing during the crisis with the perception that they should not be blamed for causing 
or allowing the crisis to occur or be held responsible for any of the deficiencies in how 
the crisis was handled. Furthermore, in addition to including addressing blame risk, these 
five key tasks must also happen before, during, and after the crisis, which amounts to 
political crisis leadership, whereas applying the five tasks during the crisis amounts 
to political crisis management. Since the most important of these tasks for a 
political official is meaning making, political officials can best lead crises 
before they happen by establishing resilience narratives. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Emergencies and disasters are inherently political events. Major crises in the 
United States in recent years have transformed political careers, for better or worse. 
Furthermore, scholars have taken an interest in determining the political factors involved 
with these emergencies and disasters and the political crises they produce, seeking to 
determine how politics drive recovery efforts, what factors contribute to a politician’s 
success or failure following a crisis, and what characteristics and tools political leaders 
should deploy to best manage a crisis, or at least, create the perception of effective 
leadership during a crisis.  
Current scholarship argues five key tasks for political officials allow them to 
manage these crises: sensemaking, decision making, meaning making, terminating, and 
learning. These tasks are ongoing throughout an emergency or disaster, and are intended 
to allow the official both to govern and avoid blame for causing the crisis or any 
additional crises that result from how it was handled. For elected and appointed officials, 
the most important of these tasks is meaning making, or, the messaging of the event that 
explains what happened, what the consequences are, and how the causes and 
consequences are being addressed. 
While this model is valuable, it outlines how political officials ought to manage 
crises, and it does not account for how they actually behave. While this model does 
acknowledge that political figures must both govern and avoid blame for the event, it 
does not take into consideration the scholarship of blame risk and blame avoidance, 
which suggests that political leaders are far more likely to focus their efforts on avoiding 
blame than on governing during catastrophic events. If managing the blame risk of crises 
figures significantly into political calculations during crises, then the current prescriptive 
model must be expanded to include these considerations. 
This thesis accepts the five key tasks for political leaders, but it also accepts the 
reality of blame risk and blame avoidance. Elected officials must indeed manage the 
 xii
crisis, as well as managing any potential blame from that crisis, or they will not be able to 
lead going forward.  
To expand the existing model and address legitimate concerns of blame risk and 
blame avoidance, an expanded model is provided with two key features. First, it makes a 
distinction between political crisis management and political crisis leadership. Political 
crisis management describes actions of political leaders who are focused primarily on 
managing the blame during the event. Political crisis leadership describes actions of 
political leaders focused on both governing and blame avoidance before, during, and after 
the event. In this expanded model, applying the five key tasks before, during, and after 
the incident through political crisis leadership is the preferred approach.  
Second, this thesis argues for the development of resilience narratives before a 
crisis occurs. Resilience narratives are efforts to communicate a jurisdiction’s history of 
overcoming difficulty and adversity. They can be developed by political leaders through 
various means, but they are established early on to establish renewal narratives better 
during and after the event. Since they are developed before a crisis and they transform to 
renewal narratives during and after the crisis, they are an example of meaning making in 
the political crisis leadership model. 
This expanded model is based on concepts from the current literature on crisis 
leadership, political crises, and crisis narratives, which are all applied to and examined 
through case studies from recent crises within the state of Nevada. These incidents are 
both man-made and natural disasters, and they occur over long and short time periods. 
These case studies allow for the actions and decisions of political leaders during crisis to 
be analyzed and for the model presented in this thesis to be developed. 
xiii
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Addressing Congress in 1996, James Lee Witt, the former administrator of the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency, noted, “Disasters are very political events.”1 A 
study of disaster declarations for flood-related incidents from 1965 to 1997, for instance, 
showed that instances of presidential disaster declarations were 45 percent higher during 
election years than in non-election years.2 As political events, disasters also have the 
ability to alter the trajectory of political careers, either in politicians’ favor or to their 
detriment.3  
Two prominent disasters, both involving sitting presidents and the mayors of the 
affected cities, exemplify divergent ways that politicians manage the political nature of 
crises. The first, the attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, show President 
George W. Bush and New York City Mayor Rudy Giuliani largely benefiting politically 
from the attacks. Conversely, when Hurricane Maria devastated Puerto Rico in 
September 2017, President Donald Trump and San Juan, Puerto Rico Mayor Carmen 
Yulín Cruz exchanged barbs publically, apparently in an effort to damage the other 
politically. Each incident shows the impact of political crisis leadership and political 
crisis management, respectively, during major crises. 
President Bush believed that history would judge him largely by how well he 
responded to the attacks on his country so early in his tenure.4 By October 8 following 
the attacks, his political advisor, Karl Rove, had produced the first of his “racing forms,” 
detailing polling analysis that showed the public was responding to the president’s 
leadership following the attacks approvingly, with his approval rating as ranging from a 
                                                 
1 Alan B. Krueger, “At FEMA, Disasters and Politics Go Hand in Hand,” New York Times, September 
15, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/15/business/at-fema-disasters-and-politics-go-hand-in-hand. 
html?mcubz=3. 
2 Mary W. Downton and Roger A. Pielke Jr., “Discretion without Accountability: Politics, Flood 
Damage, and Climate,” Natural Hazards Review 2, no. 4 (November 2001): 163. 
3 Kevin Arceneaux and Robert M. Stein, “Who is Held Responsible for a Natural Disaster in an Urban 
Election,” Journal of Urban Affairs 28, no. 1 (2006): 43–53. 
4 Bob Woodward, Bush at War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002), 205. 
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remarkable 84 to 90 percent.5 Rove believed these polling numbers would provide the 
president with enormous political capital for 30 or 40 weeks after the attack.6 By 
February 2004, Rove had realized that the decision to invade Iraq had become a political 
negative for the president.7 In addition to the harm caused by the Iraq War, the 
president’s handling of Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans in 2006 further damaged him 
politically.8  
The president’s temporary boost in approval ratings contrasted the political 
fortunes of Mayor Giuliani, the local leader with whom he was seen to work so closely 
following the attack, and for whom the attacks proved to be transformational. Even 
though some criticized his city’s emergency preparedness before the event and response 
during the event, the unifying leadership he embodied in the aftermath became the 
cornerstone of his legacy. The New York Times summarized this transformation, stating 
his leadership that day morphed him from “a grouchy pol slip-sliding into irrelevancy to 
the Republican presidential candidate introduced as America’s mayor.”9 One of the major 
reasons for the positive impact of the terrorist attacks on Mayor Giuliani’s political career 
may have been that his leadership, and the leadership of others, was perceived as aligning 
with views of how a political official should act during such a dramatic and traumatic 
event. 
Hurricane Maria, which hit Puerto Rico in September 2017, shows a contrasting 
view of how local and national chief executives worked in the aftermath of a major event. 
In what would become an infamous exchange, Mayor Yulín Cruz lashed out on 
September 29, 2017 at acting Homeland Security Secretary Elaine Duke’s optimistic 
                                                 
5 Woodward, Bush at War, 206. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004), 430. 
8 Arjen Boin, Paul ‘t Hart, and Allan McConnell, “Crisis Exploitation: Political and Policy Impacts of 
Framing Contests,” Journal of European Policy 16, no. 1 (December 2008): 81–82. 
9 Michael Powell, “In 9/11 Chaos, Giuliani Forged a Lasting Image,” New York Times, September 21, 
2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/21/us/politics/21giuliani.html?mcubz=3.  
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comments on the federal response efforts, stating that it was “not a good news story.”10 
She went on to criticize the federal response efforts by stating, “We are dying, and you 
are killing us with the inefficiency.”11 
The direct attacks from the mayor elicited an aggressive response from the 
president the following day, and only days after he expressed his full commitment to 
assisting the island in its recovery.12 Through his Twitter account, the president attributed 
her statements to his opponents in the Democratic Party, and stated that there was “Such 
poor leadership ability by the Mayor of San Juan, and others in Puerto Rico, who are not 
able to get their workers to help.”13 A poll taken weeks after the exchange showed that 
President Trump’s approval ratings for hurricane response had “plummeted 20 points 
since Puerto Rico was devastated by back-to-back hurricanes last month.”14  
The authors of The Politics of Crisis Management—a book that depicts Mayor 
Giuliani, President Bush, and New York Governor George Pataki on the cover—argue 
that the expected actions of public officials during crises amount to five key tasks: 
sensemaking, decision making, meaning making, terminating, and learning.15 As the 
senior executive public official for the city who received the bulk of the attacks that day, 
Mayor Giuliani was able to exhibit these characteristics while offering comfort and 
support within the first few hours of the attacks; characteristics that some have attributed 
directly to the remarkable transformation of his political career.16 
                                                 
10 Daniella Diaz, “San Juan Mayor: ‘Dammit, This is Not a Good News Story,” CNN Politics, 
September 29, 2017, http://www.cnn.com/2017/09/29/politics/puerto-rico-hurricane-maria-san-juan-mayor-
trump-response/index.html.  
11 “Hurricane Maria: Puerto Rican Mayor Says US ‘Killing Us with the Inefficiency,” ABC News 
Online, September 29, 2017, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-09-30/puerto-rico-mayor-criticises-us-aid-
response/9003760.  
12 “Hurricane Maria: Donald Trump Snaps at Puerto Rico Capital’s Mayor over Emergency Aid 
Criticism,” ABC News Online, September 30, 2017, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-09-30/trump-snaps-
at-san-juan-mayor-over-hurricane-maria-aid-criticism/9004614.  
13 Ibid. 
14 Mary Papenfuss, “Trump’s Approval for Hurricane Response Plunges 20 Points after Puerto Rico 
Storms,” Huffington Post, October 17, 2017, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/trump-approval-pue 
rto-rico-hurricane_us_59e582b3e4b02a215b3288ee.  
15 Arjen Boin et al., The Politics of Crisis Management: Public Leadership under Pressure 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 10.  
16 Powell, “In 9/11 Chaos, Giuliani Forged a Lasting Image.”  
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How exactly Mayor Giuliani not only survived the terrorist attacks politically but 
also flourished afterward has been foundational to research ever since, especially for 
those interested in finding a formula for success that differentiates a positive political 
outcome from a negative one. Contrasting Giuliani’s heroic image after the 9/11 attacks 
with that of President Bush’s following his administration’s response to Hurricane 
Katrina, some research provides a framework for how the actions of political leaders 
should be assessed during crises.17 Other research identifies an “incumbency advantage” 
for elected officials in future elections by studying voting trends in Florida before and 
after Hurricane Andrew.18 Another work argues that the political impacts of crises are 
difficult to predict; however, elected and appointed officials may best lead through and 
survive a crisis by establishing the frames that form the dominant perception of events.19  
Since politicians must pursue the dual objectives of both governing and avoiding 
blame for a crisis, the most important of the five key tasks outlined in The Politics of 
Crisis Management is meaning making. Elected and appointed officials can communicate 
the results of their sensemaking efforts to the public, as well as their decisions on how to 
address the crisis. As the crisis develops and terminates, they can also frame the crisis 
through narratives that help them avoid the blame as well. If successful, these narratives 
can set the foundation for the formal organizational learning that takes place after the 
incident. 
However, all these activities occur during and after an incident, and it is proposed 
in this thesis that political crisis leadership must also occur beforehand. If the objective of 
political leaders is to govern and avoid blame, and if meaning making is their primary 
mechanism for doing both, then political crisis leaders should work to establish narratives 
prior to crises that they can then transform during and after the event, which are described 
in this paper as “resilience narratives.”  
                                                 
17 Arjen Boin, Sanneke Kuipers, and Werner Overdijk, “Leadership in Times of Crisis: A Framework 
for Assessment,” International Review of Public Administration 18, no. 1 (2013): 79.  
18 David. K. Twigg, The Politics of Disaster: Tracking the Impact of Hurricane Andrew (Gainesville: 
University Press of Florida, 2012). 
19 Boin, ‘t Hart, and McConnell, “Crisis Exploitation: Political and Policy Impacts of Framing 
Contests,” 81–106. 
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A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Instead of analyzing which actions and factors most likely lead to success for 
political leaders during or following a crisis, as has been studied elsewhere, this work is 
organized around three different questions. Which factors contribute to political leaders 
choosing to engage in political crisis leadership instead of political crisis management? 
Which methods do political crisis leaders use both to govern and to avoid blame? And 
how can political crisis leaders better lead during all phases of crises, particularly before 
they emerge? 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The understanding of crises has evolved in recent years, just as the types and 
impacts of crises have evolved. A definition from 1963 defines a crisis as “a situation that 
threatens high-priority goals of the decision-making unit; restricts the amount of time 
available for response before the decision is transformed, and surprises the members of 
the decision-making unit by its occurrence.”20 Challenging all three aspects of this 
definition in their 1989 work, Coping with Crises: The Management of Disasters, Riots 
and Terrorism, authors Uriel Rosenthal, Michael T. Charles, and Paul ‘t Hart argue that a 
crisis is “a serious threat to the basic structure of fundamental value and norms of a social 
system, which—under time pressures and highly uncertain circumstances—necessitates 
making critical decisions.”21 The definition has continued to develop. 
More recently, scholars have been less interested in defining crises and have 
rather been taken by the extraordinary complexity of crises altogether. In Crisis 
Leadership: Planning for the Unthinkable, Ian Mitroff refuses to give a concrete 
definition of a crisis, instead opting to give what he calls a “guiding definition:”  
A crisis is an event that affects or has the potential to affect the whole 
organization. If something affects only a small part of an organization it 
may not be a crisis. In order for a crisis to result, it must exact a major toll 
                                                 
20 Charles F. Hermann, “Some Consequences of Crisis which Limit the Viability of Organizations,” 
Administrative Science Quarterly 8 (1963): 61–82. 
21 Uriel Rosenthal, Michael T. Charles, and Paul ‘t Hart, Coping with Crises: The Management of 
Disasters, Riots and Terrorism (Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thompson Publisher, 1989), 10. 
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on the lives, property, financial earnings, reputations and general well-
being of an organization. More often than not, all of these occur 
simultaneously. A crisis is something that ‘cannot be contained within the 
walls of the organization.’22  
Based on this purposely vague definition, Mitroff argues that contemporary crises are far 
more complex than crises from earlier periods; complexities concentrated by technology, 
while most modern organizations are still organized around machine-age principles.23 In 
Leadership in Unconventional Crises: A Transatlantic and Cross-Sector Assessment, 
Erwan Lagadec agrees with Mitroff’s overall assessment. In defining unconventional 
crises, Lagadec argues the key distinction in these new crises is found in their 
“networked” nature. In particular, it is in the “paradoxical combination of extreme 
complexity and extreme simplicity in the disruptions that modern networks enable.”24 
Both Mitroff and Lagadec envision new forms of leadership to manage these complex 
crises. They argue for a less traditional crisis management structure and call for a new 
culture of leadership as evolved as the threat of the modern or unconventional crisis.25  
Just as the complexity of crises evolves, in other words, so must the 
characteristics and cultures of leaders within organizations who confront those crises. In 
particular, Mitroff distinguishes between crisis management and crisis leadership, 
arguing strongly for the latter. Generally speaking, Mitroff argues that crisis management 
is reactive where proactive crisis leadership aims to “identify crises and prepare an 
organization systematically, i.e., as a whole system, before a major crisis has 
happened.”26 Crisis leadership, according to Mitroff, requires critical thinking, 
communication, and decision making during all phases of the crisis.27  
                                                 
22 Ian Mitroff, Crisis Leadership: Planning for the Unthinkable (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons, 
2004), 63. 
23 Ibid., 17. 
24 Erwan Lagadec, Leadership in Unconventional Crises: A Transatlantic and Cross-Sector 
Assessment (Washington, DC: Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2009), 2. 
25 Ibid., 30; Mitroff, Crisis Leadership: Planning for the Unthinkable, 10. 
26 Mitroff, Crisis Leadership: Planning for the Unthinkable, 10. 
27 Ibid., 5. 
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In his 2013 volume titled Handbook of Research on Crisis Leadership in 
Organizations, Andrew J. DuBrin summarizes the arguments on crisis definition, 
typology, and leadership. He writes, “Crisis leadership is the process of leading group 
members through a sudden and largely unanticipated, intensely negative, and emotionally 
draining circumstances.”28 He continues, “Crises facing organizations can be classified as 
financial, informational, destruction of property, human resources, reputational, and 
violent behavior.”29 
Even as the academic understanding of crises has evolved, and as variations in 
definitions have exposed different academic perspectives, as shown through the 
definitions provided in this thesis, several consistent aspects to a unified definition have 
emerged. Based on the similarities in these definitions, it can be inferred that crises 
appear in many forms, they involve at least the threat of negative disruption to systems 
and services, and the perception of risk and threat changes for various actors over time, as 
the crisis becomes more or less acute. Accepting Mitroff’s distinction between “crisis 
manager” and “crisis leader” also implies that crises are best addressed at the strategic, 
operational, and tactical levels. 
C. ADDRESSING POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF CRISES 
Often, as these complex and unconventional crises have an impact on the public, 
elected officials must take action or suffer political consequences, meaning that political 
crisis leadership is a category of crisis leadership. In “Political Leadership in Times of 
Crisis,” the authors argue that “in today’s world, political leaders may well be defined in 
terms of their performance under pressure and stress.”30 Thus, elected leaders must learn 
to act during times when the “stakes are much higher, the public is much more attentive, 
                                                 
28 Andrew J. DuBrin, “Personal Attributes and Behaviors of Effective Crisis Leaders,” in Handbook of 
Research on Crisis Leadership in Organizations, ed. Andrew J. DuBrin (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 2013), 20. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Chris Hansell, Arjen Boin, and Paul ‘t Hart, “Political Leadership in Times of Crisis,” in The 
Oxford Handbook of Political Leadership, ed. R.A.W. Rhodes and Paul ‘t Hart (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2014), 418. 
 8
its mood more volatile, and institutional constraints on elite decision making are 
considerably looser.”31 
These authors note that scholars have studied crises since the 1960s; yet, it was 
not until the 1980s that public administration and policy scholars began to study the 
subject. This interest in crisis in these fields developed two main branches of research, 
they argue, first, research studied how government processes and structure changed in 
response to crises, and the second branch of research “conceptualized crises as ‘critical 
junctures’ in politics and public policy.”32 These authors argue that throughout this 
period, “a genuinely interdisciplinary venture has emerged,” which is based on a 
fundamental assumption, “that conditions of crisis—high threat, uncertainty, and deep 
urgency—evoke political and psychological mechanisms that change the way in which 
people, organizations, governments, polities, and media act and interact, yielding both 
great challenges and great opportunities for the exercise of public leadership.”33 
This research suggests that in these complex, modern crises, elected and 
appointed political figures see an intense leadership challenge. They recognize potential 
calamity and consequences, which can be negative accountability measures or positive 
opportunities, and that they must navigate these issues. “Just as crisis politics differs from 
politics as usual, crisis leadership differs from leadership in routine times,” these authors 
write.34 
In The Politics of Crisis Management: Public Leadership Under Pressure, Arjen 
Boin, Paul ‘t Hart, Eric Stern, and Bengt Sendelius provide a framework for 
understanding political leadership during crises. They are careful to note that they are not 
providing a handbook for elected officials to use during crises, but rather they aim to 
extend the interdisciplinary approach of political crisis leadership. “We view crisis 
management not just in terms of the coping capacity of governmental institutions and 
public policies but first and foremost as a deeply controversial and intensely political 
                                                 
31 Hansell, Boin, and ‘t Hart, “Political Leadership in Times of Crisis,” 418–419. 
32 Ibid., 420. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid., 418. 
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activity.”35 Through their work, they wish to contribute by highlighting the “political 
dimensions of crisis leadership: issues of conflict, power, and legitimacy.”36 
According to The Politics of Crisis Management, political leaders can avail 
themselves of five essential tasks during crises: “sensemaking,” “decision making,” 
“meaning making,” “terminating,” and “learning.” These individual tasks are not 
necessarily linear in nature and can take place at different times and varying intensities 
throughout a crisis. Due to this fact, these authors embrace something akin to the vague 
definition of crisis offered by Mitroff and Lagadec, stating, “non-linear dynamics and 
complexity make a crisis hard to detect.”37  
Sensemaking is detecting the development of a crisis before, during, and after the 
event.38 Since “the driving mechanisms of crisis are often concealed behind (and 
embedded within) the complexities of our modern systems,” political leaders at the 
strategic level must ensure that subordinate leaders at the operational and tactical levels 
have appropriate mechanisms in place to detect rising crises to frame those crises in a 
way that allows them to manage them.39 If these do not exist, then it is possible that the 
image projected to the outside is one of “paralysis and ineffectiveness.”40  
But even when these mechanisms are in place within organizational structures 
that does not always mean that the data are not “the subject of a political process.”41 In 
other words, when data is presented, organizations have the ability to interpret it, with 
some choosing “to divorce themselves from any impending threat” to avoid blame, while 
others “may seek to define the problem at hand in such a way that the organization will 
                                                 
35 Boin et al., The Politics of Crisis Management: Public Leadership under Pressure, 9. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid., 7. 
38 Ibid., 10–11. 
39 Ibid., 19. 
40 Ibid., 23. 
41 Ibid., 22. 
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actually benefit from the crisis.”42 The impacts of these political approaches can be 
mitigated by how political leaders choose to make sense of the crisis and the response.  
Decision making refers to the need for political leaders to make decisions during 
crises; however, these authors challenge how crisis decision making is commonly 
viewed.43 It is often assumed that effective crisis management is based on critical 
decisions made by leaders at key junctures during the crisis; however, they argue that a 
much more important factor is how the leader chooses to make decisions that lead to a 
“facilitation of crisis implementation and coordination throughout the response 
network.”44 That is, “crises present leaders with choice opportunities” that are “highly 
consequential,” they are likely to present “trade-off choices,” they can “present leaders 
with major uncertainties,” and they must be made within strict time constraints.45 
Meaning making as an essential task for political leaders during crisis combines 
sensemaking and decision making by providing an opportunity for political leaders to 
shape “people’s understanding of a crisis and thus in building public support for their 
policies.”46 Meaning making by political leaders during crisis is important for a number 
of reasons, but primarily by attempting to “reduce the public and political uncertainty of 
the crisis.”47 Political leaders do this “by communicating a persuasive story line (a 
narrative) that explains what happened, why it had to be that way, what its repercussions 
are, how it can be resolved, who can be relied upon to do so, and who is to blame.”48 
Providing this information through a crisis narrative allows leaders to maintain support 
during the crisis and to avoid blame in its aftermath. 
Terminating as an essential task for political crisis leaders is greater than ending 
the response activities. In fact, for political leaders, the political crisis can become more 
                                                 
42 Boin et al., The Politics of Crisis Management: Public Leadership under Pressure, 23. 
43 Ibid., 11–12. 
44 Ibid., 43. 
45 Ibid., 44–45. 
46 Ibid., 69. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid., 69–70. 
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acute for their offices after the immediate threat and danger passes.49 These authors argue 
that the termination of the crisis depends directly on “the way leaders deal with the 
accountability process following the operational phase of the crisis.”50  
Learning as an essential task for crisis political leaders refers to how political 
leaders and others decide to change their organizations, policies, and procedures in the 
aftermath of a crisis.51 Learning following a crisis often comes through blue-ribbon 
committees, legislative reviews, or formal assessments of other kinds. Learning is how 
blame and credit can be determined, and how policy changes must happen.52  
D. MANAGING CRISES THROUGH MEANING MAKING 
As the authors of The Politics of Crisis Management point out, political leaders 
during crises are tasked with dual objectives, they must both govern through the crisis by 
“shifting back from emergency to routine,” and they must also provide a believable 
explanation for what has happened and why they should not be blamed for it.53 However, 
giving these dual objectives equal weight as this work does misidentifies the true nature 
of the crisis from the perspective of the political leader, and therefore, focuses too heavily 
on how political officials ought to lead during instead of describing how they actually 
perceive the threats they face and respond accordingly. Since elected officials seldom 
face the personal urgency of fighting fire, or responding to flood, terrorist attack, or other 
major crises, their greatest risk is blame risk, or in how the public who elects or appoints 
them perceives the handling of the crisis. 
The idea of “blame risk” is studied extensively by Christopher Hood in The 
Blame Game: Spin, Bureaucracy, and Self-preservation in Government.54 The Blame 
Game builds upon a work by R. Kent Weaver, which argues that political leaders are 
                                                 
49 Boin et al., The Politics of Crisis Management: Public Leadership under Pressure, 91. 
50 Ibid., 92. 
51 Ibid., 14–15. 
52 Ibid., 129. 
53 Ibid., 14. 
54 Christopher Hood, The Blame Game: Spin, Bureaucracy, and Self-preservation in Government, 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009). 
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more likely to work to avoid blame than to position themselves to claim credit for an 
event due to a “negativity bias” among voters, which suggests that voters give politicians 
less blame for good policy than blame for failures.55 Negativity bias supports the idea 
that elected and appointed officials will apply less energy toward positioning for credit 
through governing, and greater energy toward avoiding blame. 
Hood outlines three strategies often used to avoid blame: presentational strategies, 
agency strategies, and policy strategies. Presentational strategies, which fall under 
meaning making in the framework provided in The Politics of Crisis Management, are 
often used by executive elected and appointed politicians who own responsibility for the 
systems that have been disrupted by the crisis, as well as the systems of response. 
According to Hood, “‘presentational strategies’ involve various ways of trying to avoid 
blame by spin, stage management, and argument.”56 As shown in Table 1, these 
strategies consist of four major kinds—“keeping a low profile,” “winning the argument,” 
“changing the subject,” and “drawing a line”—each of which can be deployed in different 
circumstances, although it not guaranteed that any will result in actual blame 
avoidance.57 
Table 1.   Some Examples of Presentational Strategies58 
Keeping a Low Profile: 
 
Motto: “Keep your head down until it 
blows over.” 
Example: Being unavailable for comment. 
Winning the Argument: 
 
Mott: “Fight your corner to win over your 
audience.” 
Example: Offering persuasive excuses and 
justifications. 
Changing the Subject: 
Mott: “Divert the attention of your critics 
or the public.” 
Example: Finding good times to bury bad 
news. 
Drawing the Line: 
Mott: “Disarm your critics before they turn 
nasty.” 
Example: The tactics of “sorry 
democracy.” 
                                                 
55 R. Kent Weaver, “The Politics of Blame Avoidance,” Journal of Public Policy 6, no. 4 (1986): 371–
98. 
56 Hood, The Blame Game: Spin, Bureaucracy, and Self-preservation in Government, 17. 
57 Ibid., 49. 
58 Source: Ibid. 
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Depending on the nature of the crisis and on the credibility of the political official 
feeling the blame risk, these presentational strategies can be used to avoid blame in 
multiple ways. Matthew W. Seeger and Timothy L. Sellnow argue in Narratives of 
Crisis: Telling Stories of Ruin and Renewal, that crises have enormous and immediate 
social impacts, and that “much of the meaning, power, and ultimate impact of a crisis are 
functions of the ensuing network of narratives.”59 These narratives consist of blame 
narratives, renewal narratives, hero narratives, victim narratives, and memorial narratives, 
all of which can become central aspects of presentational strategies deployed by political 
leaders to avoid or minimize blame.  
These narratives and other aspects of the presentational strategies do not exist in a 
vacuum, just as crises seldom do. Instead, according to Arjen Boin, Paul ‘t Hart, and 
Allan McConnell in their article, “Crisis Exploitation: Political and Policy Impacts of 
Framing Contests,” “crises typically generate a contest between frames and counter-
frames concerning the nature and severity of a crisis, its causes, the responsibility for its 
occurrence or escalation, and implications for the future.”60 How effectively political 
officials deploy presentational strategies and crisis narratives to avoid blame will often 
dictate how they weather the crisis, even more than how effectively the government 
manages the public safety or other risks of the crisis. 
Lars W. Nord and Eva-Karin Olsson describe how one political official can 
establish a dominant frame and win the framing contest as described by Boin, ‘t Hart, and 
McConnell in “Frame, Set, Match! Towards a model of successful crisis rhetoric.” In this 






                                                 
59 Matthew W. Seeger and Timothy L. Sellnow, Narratives of Crisis: Telling Stories of Ruin and 
Renewal (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2016), 9. 
60 Boin, ‘t Hart, and McConnell, “Crisis Exploitation: Political and Policy Impacts of Framing 
Contests,” 82. 
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crisis. The primary factor in assessing political actors’ ability to avoid blame is in how 
well they can frame the crisis as exogenous (outside of their control) instead of 
endogenous (they are both responsible for the crisis and its causes).61 As the nature of the 
crisis may dictate whether it is framed as exogenous or endogenous, the authors suggest a 
three-part model that can be used by political actors to avoid blame during a crisis. Their 
model begins with “the frames promoted by the political actor,” it then goes to how well 
those frames resonate with other frames to make them more powerful, and finally, how 
those strengthened frames resonate with the existing media narratives, or media logic, 
surrounding the crisis.62 
If the crisis has passed and damage has been done by blame being assigned to the 
elected or appointed officials for various aspects of the crisis, they may have to work to 
restore their reputations after the crisis has terminated. William L. Benoit bases his theory 
of image restoration on two basic assumptions in his work, Accounts, Excuses, and 
Apologies: A Theory of Image Restoration Strategies, first, that communication is “a 
goal-directed strategy,” and second, that “maintaining a positive reputation is one of the 
central goals of communication.”63 Based on these assumptions, Benoit provides five 
methods that can be used to restore someone’s image after blame has been assigned: 
denial, evasion, reducing offensiveness, corrective action, and victimage (scapegoating) 
and mortification (accepting blame and seeking forgiveness).64 
As Table 2 shows, Mitroff argues that the differences between crisis management 
and crisis leadership are significant. 
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Table 2.   Characteristics of Political Crisis Management vs. Political Crisis 
Leadership65 
Characteristics of Crisis Management Characteristics of Crisis Leadership 
Technical approach to handling crises Philosophical approach to handling crises 
Takes place during crisis Takes place before, during, and after crisis
Reactive to the crisis Proactive toward unthinkable crises 
Centralized/bureaucratic Globally integrated/locally responsible 
 
Although several key differences appear between crisis leadership and crisis 
management, Mitroff argues that the central difference is that crisis leadership understand 
the need to manage the four factors of a crisis—“crisis types,” “crisis mechanisms,” 
“crisis systems,” and “crisis stakeholders”—“before, during, and after a crisis.”66 If the 
same factors apply to the differences between political crisis management and political 
crisis leadership, and if the time component is also the key differentiation between 
political crisis management and political crisis leadership, then the time component can 
help illuminate the difference between decisions to govern or manage blame during the 
stages of crises by political officials.  
An overlap occurs between political crisis management and political crisis 
leadership, though. Elected and appointed officials practicing political crisis leadership, 
those who lead before, during, and after a crisis, also have to manage during the crisis, 
just like those practicing political crisis management. The key difference between how 
political crisis leaders manage crises, though, is that they focus on both governing and 
avoiding blame, while political crisis managers focus their actions during the crisis more 
on blame avoidance and less on governing during the crisis, which can become image 




                                                 
65 Adapted from Mitroff, Crisis Leadership: Planning for the Unthinkable, 10. 
66 Mitroff, Crisis Leadership: Planning for the Unthinkable, 4–5. 
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Table 3.   Political Crisis Management Framework67 
  Before During After 
Sensemaking   
Assess crisis and 
determine the potential 
blame risk.   
Decision 
Making   
Emphasize reduction of 
blame risk over 
operational 
considerations.   
Meaning 
Making   
Invoke blame narratives 
or other presentational 
strategies to avoid 
blame.   
Terminating   
Work to terminate blame 
risk instead of terminate 
operational crisis.   
Learning   
Avoid organizational 
learning that may bring 
more scrutiny and 
ongoing blame risk 
potential.    
 
Table 3 depicts the political crisis manager’s emphasis on blame avoidance during 
a crisis, while Table 4 shows the political crisis leader’s focus on both governing and 
avoiding blame during all phases of the crisis; that is, before, during, and after. These 
tables show an application of Mitroff’s characteristics of both political crisis managers 
and political crisis leaders as organized by the five key tasks for political officials during 
crises: sensemaking, decision making, meaning making, terminating, and learning.  
 
 
                                                 
67 Adapted from Boin et al., The Politics of Crisis Management: Public Leadership under Pressure, 
10-15; Mitroff, Crisis Leadership: Planning for the Unthinkable, 10. 
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Table 4.   Political Crisis Leadership Framework68 
  Before During After 
Sensemaking 
Imagine worst-case crises 
and develop detection and 
information sharing 
mechanisms.  
Assess crisis to 
determine potential 
consequences for 
jurisdiction as we as 
potential blame risk. 
Improve understanding of 
worst-case crises and 
effectiveness of detection 




Plan, train, and exercise 
through entire government 




governing with blame 
risk reduction. 
Improve preparedness 
efforts based on 
effectiveness of response 









Continue to develop 
renewal narrative 
throughout the recovery 
process. 
Terminating   
Work to terminate 
blame risk while also 
terminating 


















These two tables show two items of note. First, while the entire “before” and 
“after” periods are shaded in for the political crisis manager, indicating a lack of attention 
to the crisis outside of the “during” phase, the entry for “terminating” is shaded in for the 
political crisis leader table. While some methods may be implemented that a political 
crisis leader can work with to terminate a crisis before it starts or after it is over, such 
methods need to be studied in future research, as it is not the focus of this study.  
 
                                                 
68 Adapted from Boin et al., The Politics of Crisis Management: Public Leadership under Pressure, 
10-15; Mitroff, Crisis Leadership: Planning for the Unthinkable, 10. 
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Also of note is the reference to “resilience narratives” in the political crisis leader 
table listed under “meaning making” before the crisis occurs. Resilience narratives 
amount to intentional efforts by political leaders to establish a message of resilience long 
before a crisis can occur, and that can be transformed into renewal narratives during the 
crisis and when it has terminated. The frameworks provided in this thesis for political 
crisis management and political crisis leadership, as well as the development of the 
concept resilience narratives, amount to the novel contribution of this work. 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
While this thesis involves aspects of each of the topics discussed in these 
preceding works, it also aims to expand on them in a number of ways. First, this thesis 
modifies the current five-part framework. Second, it asks a different set of questions than 
the scholarship briefly cited. And third, it offers practical recommendations for how 
political leaders can better prepare for the political and operational implications of a 
crisis.  
First, the framework of the five key tasks presented in The Politics of Crisis 
Management is generally accepted in this thesis, as is the assertion that these five tasks 
must be directed toward the elected or appointed officials’ dual objectives of both 
governing and avoiding blame for the crisis.69 However, this five-part framework is 
prescriptive in nature, defining how elected officials ought to behave during crises, and 
therefore, insufficiently describes how political officials actually do behave during crises. 
In a very minor addition to this current and dominant framework, this work argues for a 
descriptive addendum that distinguishes between what is referred to as political crisis 
leadership and political crisis management. 
The development of the concepts of political crisis leadership and political crisis 
management are related directly to the concepts of crisis leadership and crisis 
management. The key difference between the concepts, then, is that political crisis  
 
 
                                                 
69 Boin et al., The Politics of Crisis Management: Public Leadership under Pressure, 14. 
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management is reactive and takes place during the crisis while political crisis leadership 
is proactive and strategic and takes place before, during, and after the crisis. Another 
difference between the two concepts is that politicians who engage in crisis management 
focus primarily on blame avoidance or blame management during the crisis while 
political crisis leadership balances the need to govern and avoid blame throughout all 
stages of the crisis.  
The decision by political leaders to call for a written record of the failures that led 
to the attacks of September 11, 2001, through The 9/11 Commission Report, exemplifies 
a difference between political crisis leadership and political crisis management, 
especially with respect to the key task of learning. This task almost by definition must 
take place after the critical point in the incident has terminated, and it involves formal 
mechanisms like the blue ribbon commission or policymaking bodies to examine the 
situation, make recommendations, and otherwise find changes that will prevent such 
failures in the future. Political crisis managers seldom engage in the high liability activity 
of learning because they do not wish to encourage others to examine what mistakes were 
made.70 However, few crises in the nation’s history have resulted in as robust and public 
an analysis as that produced in the 9/11 Commission Report, the final chapter of which 
outlines comprehensive recommendations for ensuring that future attacks are avoided.71  
Case studies are used to answer the research questions in a way that can be 
generalized for other political leaders and other crises in the future. The case studies in 
this thesis examine three specific crises that took place in recent years in the state of 
Nevada. The incidents have varying time pressures—fast-moving, slow-moving, and a 
combination thereof—and they are both man-made and naturally occurring incidents. The 
analysis in the case studies focuses primarily on the actions of political leaders. 
Through the actions of political leaders during these three crises, it is argued in 
this paper that the most significant factor in determining whether a political leader 
                                                 
70 Ibid., 118. 
71 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the 
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Company), 399–428. 
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chooses to pursue political crisis leadership or political crisis management is the 
perception of blame risk. That is, if the political leaders perceive they have a high 
likelihood of being blamed for the crisis or how it is handled, they choose political crisis 
management, or conversely, if they perceive that they have a low likelihood of being 
blamed for the crisis or how it is handled, they choose political crisis leadership. 
According to the authors of The Politics of Crisis Management, the blame risk is most 
defined during the termination of a crisis, suggesting that blame risk is associated directly 
with the speed with which the crisis ends.72 It is further argued in this work that effective 
crisis leaders use presentational strategies to set a dominant narrative that not only 
highlights the effective steps taken to manage the crisis, but also ensures they are not 
blamed for causing or mishandling the event. Finally, because political crisis leaders use 
presentational strategies during or after crises to both govern and avoid blame, they can 
take steps to establish resilience narratives prior to the crisis that transition into renewal 
narratives during and after the crisis terminates. 
F. CHAPTER OUTLINE 
Chapter II is a case study that examines the April 2014 standoff between law 
enforcement and the family of Cliven Bundy and their militia supporters. Chapter III is a 
case study that examines the assassination of two Las Vegas Metropolitan Police 
Department Officers by radicals hoping to spark an anti-government revolution in June 
2014. Chapter IV is case study that examines a series of flooding events that occurred 
throughout northern Nevada in January and February 2017, each resulting in presidential 
major disaster declarations. Chapter V provides analysis of the three case studies and 
concludes with recommendations regarding the use of “resilience narratives” by political 
leaders before crises occur. Chapter VI provides a coda for this thesis, describing political 
crisis leadership during a mass shooting attack in Las Vegas, Nevada, and how resilience 
narratives were employed by a key political leader to establish the framework for the 
resilience narrative that followed.  
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II. THE BUNKERVILLE STANDOFF: APRIL 2014 
On April 12, 2014, local, state, and federal law enforcement officials faced off 
with hundreds of militia members who had gathered near the town of Bunkerville, 
Nevada, at the call of rancher Cliven Bundy and his family. The “Battle of Bunkerville,” 
as the militia members called it, was a political and public safety crisis that reached its 
acute stage that morning in the rural Nevada desert in 2014, but it had been a slow-
moving crisis that had been building for weeks, years, and even decades before. And it 
continued for long afterwards. 
The blame risk associated with the Bunkerville standoff was substantial for all the 
elected officials involved. It was the latest in a longstanding and very contentious dispute 
over the rights of private citizens to use public lands, and one that often pitted states’ 
rights against federal authority. Local elected leaders, particularly elected law 
enforcement, were responsible for keeping the peace within Clark County, and the state 
government had an interest and some authority in preserving the peace as well. When 
federal officials chose to enforce a court order to impound Bundy’s cattle by deploying 
law enforcement, the Bundy family and their fellow militia members had a near perfect 
scenario to claim they were victims of federal overreach. 
The tension built between law enforcement and heavily armed citizens and 
increased under national media attention. The standoff was heavily covered by the 
national media, and media outlets sympathetic to the Bundy family, like Alex Jones, 
reinforced the militia’s narrative by referring to the standoff as “a Waco-style 
confrontation.”73 This attention increased the blame risk for the elected officials 
involved, and it continued for months after the federal government chose to acquiesce to 
the militia members’ demands and release the cattle; a decision that had significant 
implications for the future of the federalism issues surrounding land management and 
land use by private citizens. 
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A. RANGE WAR 
The current tension between local ranchers in the American west and the federal 
government began in earnest in the late 1970s and continued through the 1980s, when it 
failed to gain the necessary political traction. The Sagebrush Rebellion, as the ranchers’ 
movement was known at the time, represented differences between land management 
practices by the federal government and local ranch operations practices.74 Specifically, 
ranchers bristled at what they perceived as the federal government’s penchant for 
increasing fees required for grazing, reducing or cancelling grazing permits seemingly on 
a whim, and otherwise requiring the ranchers to pay fees that other users of the rangeland 
did not have to pay.75 Although several federal agencies were involved, the Bureau of 
Land Management (BLM) received much of the ranchers’ attention and ire during the 
rebellion.  
Although the resistance to federal land management spanned the Great Basin and 
the greater west, the Sagebrush Rebellion essentially started in Nevada when the state 
legislature passed Assembly Bill 413, which asserted that the state now held control of 
“48 million acres of BLM lands in Nevada, roughly 79 percent of the state.”76 Assembly 
Bill 413 in Nevada exemplified much of the action of the Sagebrush Rebellion 
throughout its existence, which mostly consisted of state governments passing laws and 
private citizens using administrative and legal means to pursue remedies for their 
complaints. Although the Sagebrush Rebellion gained national attention, and even 
support from President Ronald Reagan, the movement faltered in the early 1980s when 
the rebels failed to convert their “dissatisfaction into meaningful political power.”77 The 
movement ended, but the tension between ranchers in the west and federal land managers 
lingered.  
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Cliven Bundy’s confrontation of the federal government in 2014 was the 
culmination of his life as a rancher in rural Clark County, Nevada, during the days of the 
Sagebrush Rebellion. Bundy moved to Bunkerville, Nevada, as a young child in the 
1950s when his father, David Ammon Bundy, brought his family there from Mount 
Trumbull, Arizona.78 David Bundy applied for and received his initial permit to graze 95 
cattle in 1953 and began grazing on the Bunkerville Allotment in 1954.79 Cliven 
continued to pay the grazing fees to the BLM from 1973 to 1993, but after 1993, when 
the BLM reduced the number of cattle he was allowed to graze to 150 cattle, the younger 
Bundy stopped paying his fees.80 Nonetheless, he continued to graze 192 cattle on the 
Bunkerville Allotment.81  
The BLM’s decision to reduce the number of cattle grazing on federally managed 
land was based on a larger decision to set aside hundreds of thousands of acres of land for 
conservation.82 This decision was the result of a 1989 decision by the U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service to list the desert tortoise as “endangered,” and a year later, it changed 
the listing to “threatened.”83 This decision, though based on federal policy from multiple 
agencies, further reinforced the ranchers’ view that their needs were prioritized below the 
wishes of the other users of federal land.  
A series of legal battles over the years culminated in the 2014 standoff. The BLM 
issued orders for Bundy to remove his cattle in 1994 and again in 1995.84 In 1996, the 
Nevada State Legislature sought to reassert states’ rights against federal land managers in 
their jurisdiction by again taking action to amend the Nevada Constitution by repealing 
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the “disclaimer clause,” which had precluded Nevadans from the right to own the vast 
acreage of public land in the state.85 The repeal by the legislature and citizens of Nevada 
was mostly symbolic though, and in 1998, the U.S. District Court of Nevada issued an 
order to Bundy reading, in part, “it is further ordered that Bundy is permanently enjoined 
from grazing his livestock within the Bunkerville Allotment and shall remove his 
livestock from this allotment on or before November 30, 1998.”86  
Considerable and increased angst and even violence against the federal 
government was seen during this same period in Nevada and nationwide. In 1992 and 
1993, respectively, the United States saw the Ruby Ridge standoff in Idaho and the Waco 
raid in Texas, both of which attracted overwhelming national news coverage and 
attention. They also attracted the attention of various right-wing groups within the 
country, particularly as both events ended in tragedy, seemingly all due to federal 
overreach and overreaction, which appeared to galvanize these groups toward violence 
against the federal government in the years that would follow, culminating with the 
bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City in 1995. 
Violence between those sympathetic to the ranchers’ cause and the federal 
government exhibited as well. In 1993, a bomb was thrown onto the roof of the BLM 
headquarters in Reno, Nevada, with no reports of injury though.87 Between March and 
August 1995, a series of bombings occurred on Forest Service property from Carson City 
to Elko, Nevada.88 These attacks did not result in any injuries, and two Nevada men were 
eventually indicted by a federal grand jury for one of the attacks in Elko.89 
Violence against the federal government over land issues in Nevada was not only 
the purview of anonymous, private citizens, either. In 1994, Richard Carver, a rancher 
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and elected county commissioner from Nye County, used heavy equipment to reopen a 
road that had been blocked by the U.S. Forest Service and threatened violence with the 
armed protesters who joined and supported him.90 A lone U.S. Forest Service agent 
“retreated up the canyon, still holding a sign that informed Carver that he was 
trespassing,” and Nevada’s then-Governor, Bob Miller, later denounced Carver’s 
actions.91 But against federal regulations and the highest state authority, Carver’s actions 
had established him as a hero for those who believed in “county supremacy” over the 
federal and state governments as he did.92 
Throughout the 1990s, Bundy continued to pursue a resolution through legal 
means; however, federal patience was wearing thin. In 2008, the Interior Board of Land 
Appeals denied Bundy’s appeal of the BLM’s decision to cancel his range improvement 
authorization.93 In 2011, the BLM sent a notice to Bundy to remove his cattle or they 
would be removed by the federal agency. He refused. Thus, in April 2012, the BLM 
initiated an operation to round up and remove more than 500 of Bundy’s cattle that were 
illegally grazing near Gold Butte, but the agency suspended the operation indefinitely 
amid safety concerns for the federal officials and contractors who were to be involved in 
the gather.94 
A similar set of circumstances developed ahead of the 2014 standoff. In July 
2013, the U.S. District Court of Nevada issued an order for Bundy to remove his cattle 
from public land within 45 days.95 In March 2014, the BLM alerted Bundy of its intent to 
gather and impound his cattle if he continued to graze them illegally on federal land. In 
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response to this notice, Bundy distributed a letter titled “Range War Emergency Notice 
and Demand for Protection” to local, state, and federal officials.96 
Bundy’s letter, which adopted the language of the Sovereign Citizen Movement, 
and his subsequent media presence, served as a call to action for members of various 
militia-related movements around the country.97 Many of the supporters of Cliven Bundy 
and his family wore military-type clothing and carried weapons in the open, all of which 
seemed to reinforce the vague threats of violence that came from Mr. Bundy and 
members of his family in public statements. Due to the growing public interest in the 
BLM’s activities in Bunkerville from both supporters and opponents of the Bundy 
family, the agency set up two “first amendment areas” in Bunkerville to provide the 
protestors a place to express their freedom of speech and also to keep them away from the 
gather operation.98 
The confluence of federal law enforcement, militia members, and media 
heightened the celebrity status of the Bundy family among their right-wing sympathizers 
around the country, status that would only continue to rise with the tensions between the 
two sides in the days following April 5, 2014, when the cattle gather began.99 On April 6, 
one of Bundy’s sons was “cited for misdemeanor refusing to disperse and resisting 
arrest,” for which he spent a day in jail.100 On April 9, as militia members began to 
converge on the Bundy’s Bunkerville ranch, another of Cliven’s sons, Ammon, was shot 
with a stun gun by BLM law enforcement officials for kicking a police dog, but not 
arrested.101  
                                                 
96 Fuller, “The Long Fight between the Bundys and the Federal Government from 1989 to Today.” 
97 J. J. McNab, “Context Matters: The Cluven Bundy Standoff—Part 1,” Forbes, April 30, 2014, 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jjmacnab/2014/04/30/context-matters-the-cliven-bundy-standoff-part-1/#3 
d03cc9d7138. 
98 Fuller, “The Long Fight between the Bundys and the Federal Government from 1989 to Today.” 
99 “Bundy’s Federal Feud: A Timeline.” 
100 Ibid. 
101 Sarah Childress, “The Battle over Bunkerville: The Bundys, the Federal Government and the New 
Militia Movement,” Frontline, May 16, 2017, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/the-battle-over-
bunkerville.  
 27
While the news coverage persisted and the Bundy family achieved even higher 
heroic status among their supporters, who continued to travel to Bunkerville, often 
armed, the political crisis grew. Elected officials from local, state, and federal 
governments conveyed their views on the standoff, with Nevada’s U.S. Senators Harry 
Reid and Dean Heller disagreeing on whether the militia members were terrorists or 
patriots, respectively.102 But for the officials closer to the activity in Nevada, and 
therefore potentially closer to the blame risk, the potential for a “Waco-style 
confrontation” required more thoughtful responses. 
On April 8, Nevada Governor Brian Sandoval issued the first of his three press 
releases regarding the ranchers’ crisis that was unfolding within his state. Noting that his 
office had received calls about the cattle gather, Governor Sandoval claimed that he 
“expressed those concerns directly to the BLM.”103 “Most disturbing to me,” the 
governor continued, “is the BLM’s establishment of a ‘First Amendment Area’ that 
tramples upon Nevadans’ fundamental rights under the U.S. Constitution.” He concluded 
his statement stating that “the BLM needs to reconsider its approach to this matter and act 
accordingly.”104 If his message was broad, national media coverage refined the target of 
the Governor’s criticism. The Drudge Report for April 9, 2014, aired Governor 
Sandoval’s statement under an inflammatory headline reading, “Governor Calls Fed 
Actions ‘Intimidation’.”105 
As the tension built in Bunkerville, and as more militia members arrived in 
Nevada to assist the Bundy family, the Governor got involved again. On April 11, he 
issued a second statement on the matter, which first restated his call to the BLM not to 
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“limit or hinder the constitutional rights of Nevadans and be mindful of its conduct.”106 
Furthermore he noted the high tensions and called for restraint from everyone involved 
before the situation turned violent.107 
By April 12, local, state, federal law enforcement faced off with armed supporters 
of the Bundy family, while BLM-contracted cowboys had gathered only about a third of 
Bundy’s approximately 900 cattle, which were dispersed across thousands of acres of 
open rangeland.108 By the afternoon of that day, the intensity of the armed standoff was 
defused, at least momentarily, when an official with the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police 
Department announced that the BLM would discontinue the cattle gather, and that the 
federal agency would be returning the cattle to the land where they were gathered in a 
short period of time.109 The tension continued again, though, when Bundy rejected the 
announcement and demanded instead that the federal government turn in all their 
weapons to the County sheriff, which he saw as the only legitimate law enforcement in 
the area, within an hour.110 When the BLM did not turn in their weapons, Bundy led 
supporters in releasing the cattle themselves.111 
The BLM released a statement acknowledging that it was discontinuing the cattle 
gather out of concerns for the safety of its staff and contractors.112 Video footage posted 
online shows the BLM law enforcement personnel retreating after the decision to 
discontinue the gather, and being jeered and taunted by supporters of the Bundy family as 
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they disembarked.113 To the militia members in Bunkerville, the BLM’s decision was 
seen as a clear retreat in the face of military resistance. As the BLM vehicles drove 
through the crowd of militia members, “Bundy’s supporters erupted with joy, waved 
flags, and called him a hero.”114 Bundy congratulated his followers, stating that they had 
“backed those bureaucrats down and they run out of this country into Utah.”115 
Acknowledging that violence had been averted, Governor Sandoval issued his third and 
final statement for the standoff on April 12, stating that he had achieved his goal of 
maintaining safety throughout the event, and he further expressed appreciation to the 
BLM for its willingness to “listen to the concerns of the people of Nevada.”116 
B. BLAME GAME 
Although the “Battle of Bunkerville” ended peacefully, the very public failure of 
the cattle gather on April 12 resulted in a blame game. A prominent conservative pundit 
in Nevada published an op-ed in the state’s largest newspaper with an op-ed on April 14, 
titled, “Blame BLM Chief Neil Kornze, period.”117 For their part, local and federal law 
enforcement noted that they would continue to pursue legitimate legal remedies against 
the militia members and the Bundy family. A spokesperson for the BLM’s noted that it 
would continue to pursue resolution to the issue through other legal means following the 
standoff that day.118 And the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department stated that it 
was participating in investigations regarding the events in Bunkerville as well.119 Both 
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agencies actions helped show they were taking the failed outcome seriously, but victory 
for the far-right militia members was emboldening as Ruby Ridge and Waco had been 
over two decades before. 
In the days and months that followed, two divergent perspectives continued to 
shape the broader understanding of what happened over that period, and who was 
responsible for it. First, on April 14, Nevada State Assemblywoman Michelle Fiore 
posted a lengthy blog entry that claimed to provide “the truth about the Bundy’s [sic] vs. 
the BLM.”120 The post begins with an emotional picture and description of her nursing a 
calf that had been separated from its mother during the cattle gather and was unable to 
receive nourishment for several days. In her post, she hails the efforts of the “American-
minded Bundy supporters,” contrasting them with the “Nazi-minded” law enforcement 
that was present.121 After proposing conspiracy theories about why the BLM wanted its 
land, she issues a call to action for her fellow elected officials to join her in writing state 
legislation that would prevent the federal government from carrying out similar actions in 
the future.122 
Second, Clark County Sheriff Doug Gillespie waited longer to share his beliefs on 
who was to blame for the standoff. In early July 2014, Gillespie spoke with members of 
the media and stated that both the BLM and Bundy shared the blame for the crisis that 
“nearly led to a bloodbath in his jurisdiction.”123 On one hand, he “harshly criticized” 
Bundy and his family members for their response to the BLM’s law enforcement actions, 
noting that he had spoken to Cliven Bundy many times prior to the standoff and urged 
him to ensure that any protests would be peaceful.124 However, Gillespie also noted that 
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the “BLM deserves blame for escalating the situation, ignoring his advice, dismissing his 
warnings and even lying about their operation.”125 Specifically, Gillespie stated that he 
had advised the federal agency to hold public meetings about the gather, meetings that 
never took place.126 
Shortly after Gillespie’s comments were published, a BLM spokesperson released 
a statement firing back at Sheriff Gillespie. “It is unfortunate that the sheriff is now 
attempting to rewrite the details of what occurred, including his claims that the BLM did 
not share accurate information,” the BLM Spokesperson said, adding that he had 
“encouraged the operation and promised to stand shoulder-to-shoulder with us as we 
enforced two recent federal court orders.”127 She concluded her statement with another 
sentiment clearly intended to offer some of the blame to Sheriff Gillespie as well. “Sadly, 
he backed out of his commitment shortly before the operation—and after months of joint 
planning—leaving the BLM and the National Park Service to handle the crowd control 
that the sheriff previously committed to handling.”128  
C. POLITICAL CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN SLOW-MOVING CRISES  
Why would an elected state legislator engage in ad hominem attacks against 
federal law enforcement officials as the situation reached its boiling point? Why would 
the state’s chief executive focus the majority of his first public statement on a First 
Amendment areas created by the BLM? And why would the responsible federal officials 
retreat from armed militants who had declared a “range war” and had shown clear signs 
of a willingness to carry one out? These decisions, and others made by these political 
leaders throughout the standoff, do not make sense when they are assessed in terms of 
political crisis leadership, but they make sense when assessed in terms of blame 
management as a form of political crisis management. 
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Each of these political actors felt a different level of blame risk, and their actions 
reflect this perception. Based on their own level of blame risk, real or perceived, they 
engaged in meaning making by deploying various presentational strategies to frame the 
events in terms favorable to them and contest the frames unfavorable to them. Although 
decisions were undoubtedly made based on intelligence, operational considerations, or 
officer safety, these efforts to manage this political crisis by decreasing personal blame 
risk directly contributed to the negative outcomes of this slow-moving crisis over the 
months and years to follow the BLM’s retreat. 
Assemblywoman Fiore had the least blame risk of any of the significant official 
political actors throughout the Bunkerville standoff. As a member of the state legislature, 
she lacked authority over this federal lands issue; in fact, Bunkerville and its residents 
were not even in her legislative district. At best, she could claim some oversight and 
budgetary responsibilities for the state agencies that deal with agriculture and natural 
resources issues, as well as some affinity for the constituents involved. Thus, the risk of 
being blamed for any negative outcome from the standoff was near zero, meaning that the 
“negativity bias” did not apply to her political calculations. Instead, Fiore sought to claim 
credit for the events at Bunkerville instead of avoiding blame, which people in her 
position do “to increase their chances of re-election, reappointment, promotion, and 
favorable repute during or even after their lifetimes.”129 
This lack of blame risk allowed Assemblywoman Fiore to be a political 
entrepreneur during the Bunkerville standoff. Through social media, she was able to tell 
an “evocative story of heroes of villains,” as described in The Politics of Crisis 
Management.130 In doing so, she was able to establish a blame narrative to “reduce, limit, 
or explain responsibility in a way that is favorable to one group or individual.”131 To her, 
the militia members were peaceful protestors who were aggressed by the “poor-excuses 
of BLM staffers,” who attacked members of the Bundy family, picking “up Mr. Bundy’s 
elderly sister from behind, a total sneak attack,” ordered a dog to attack his son Ammon, 
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and then “the brutal BLM thugs beat up Dave Bundy, a pilot out of Las Vegas.”132 In her 
telling, the brave members of the militia had stood their ground against the fascist federal 
government, they had stood for states’ rights over illegitimate federal powers, and they 
were willing to die for their cause. 
Fiore continued to attempt to set this frame and to contest frames critical of the 
Bundy standoff through her various media engagements that followed, even more than 
two years later when she participated in a lengthy article on her political activities.133 The 
article, which covered her failed congressional campaign in 2016, covers her contact with 
the anti-government militia group, the Oath Keepers, and quotes her referring to the 
Bundy’s and others as “political prisoners.”134 She even brought Cliven Bundy’s son 
Ammon to the Nevada State Legislature in 2015 to testify about her legislation that 
would encourage Nevada to take back lands managed by the federal government, a bill 
that ultimately failed to pass.135 
Governor Sandoval may have assumed that he had more blame risk than 
Assemblywoman Fiore but less than the local and federal law enforcement officials. 
While the law enforcement activities in Bunkerville were primarily federal and county-
level, the Nevada Revised Statutes does allow the Governor to take certain specific 
actions during such an event. For example, the Governor may order his agencies or his 
military forces to use force in cases of “unlawful or riotous assembly.”136 Also, the 
Nevada Revised Statutes authorizes the governor to declare a county in insurrection when 
“satisfied that the execution of civil or criminal process has been forcibly resisted in any 
county, by bodies of persons…”137 While these statutes may have applied, the 
                                                 
132 Fiore, “Assemblywoman Fiore: The Truth about the Bundy’s vs. BLM.” 
133 Nick R. Martin, “Three Days on the Trail with America’s Most Radical Pro-Gun Candidate for 
Congress,” Buzzfeed, June 13, 2016, https://www.buzzfeed.com/nickrmartin/three-days-on-the-trail-with-
americas-most-radical-pro-gun-c?utm_term=.jipZPyGdl#.ijqNdJVxn.  
134 Ibid.  
135 “Bill Backed by Cliven Bundy Supporter Falls in Nevada Legislature,” Las Vegas Sun, April 22, 
2015, https://lasvegassun.com/news/2015/apr/22/bill-backed-cliven-bundy-falls-nevada-legislature/.  
136 Nevada Revised Statutes 223.160, “Governor May Order Armed Force when Unlawful Or Riotous 
Assembly.”  
137 Nevada Revised Statutes 223.180, “Governor May Proclaim County in Insurrection.” 
 34
Governor’s decision not to invoke either of them may have been wise given the 
extremely volatile situation on the ground, and more important, how such actions may 
have played into the militants’ anti-government narrative. 
However, even if choosing not to invoke these two legal options made operational 
sense, the governor’s focus on the BLM’s establishment of First Amendment areas 
during the standoff can be understood as a presentational strategy deployed to avoid the 
risks associated with blame. In other words, the governor’s focus on the BLM’s First 
Amendment areas appears to align with the approach referred to as “changing the 
subject.”138 The most typical form of changing the subject is “the creation or use of 
diversions to avoid the spotlight of blame and shift the public agenda onto other issues,” 
which does offer an explanation for the governor’s gambit in this paper.139 However, 
because the governor also used words like “intimidation” in his initial press release, it 
appears also to be a form of “strategic evasion,” where a political leader insists “that the 
main responsibility for crisis response lies with other agencies or levels of 
government.”140 This approach was effective in the framing contest throughout the 
standoff because it appealed to the “macrolevel blame narrative” of federal overreach that 
was pervasive throughout the various iterations of the Sagebrush Rebellion.141 At the 
same time, the governor was also careful not to praise the militia members’ actions 
through his public statements as well. 
The highest blame risk during the Bunkerville Standoff was shared between the 
federal and local governments, namely the BLM and the Clark County Sheriff. Unlike 
Assemblywoman Fiore and Governor Sandoval, the federal law enforcement officials 
were responsible for carrying out the federal judge’s order.142 Furthermore according to 
the Nevada Revised Statutes, sheriffs in Nevada counties are generally responsible for 
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keeping the peace, and in particular, the statute states that they shall “keep and preserve 
the peace in their respective counties, and quiet and suppress all affrays, riots and 
insurrections.”143 Thus, not only did both law enforcement agencies have to make 
operational decisions, but they also had to make decisions that would help them avoid 
blame for this crisis within their jurisdictions.  
As a local sheriff, Sheriff Doug Gillespie chose several presentational strategies to 
avoid the blame from this crisis. He first chose to “keep a low profile,” by waiting until 
July to provide his perspective to the media.144 In his July remarks, he employed a 
different presentational strategy, namely that of “winning the argument.”145 In this 
approach, executives employ presentational strategies that make credible cases that either 
deny that a problem had arisen or acknowledge that a problem had actually existed, but 
explain that the blame truly lies elsewhere.146 This presentational strategy also amounts 
to a blame narrative, and the fact it was delivered long after the framing contests had lost 
momentum, which possibly made it more effective.147 In an interview three months after 
the event, Sheriff Gillespie outlined his criticism toward both Cliven Bundy and the 
BLM.148 As if inviting an after-action review from a federal agency, Gillespie noted, “I 
think if anybody would look at how they handled the protesting with the use of Tasers 
and police dogs, anyone would had been in policing would question those tactics.”149 
The BLM carried nearly all the blame risk throughout this event. The federal land 
management organization had allowed Bundy to continue to graze for two decades, and 
had even called off similar cattle gathers prior to the 2014 event. Officials came in with a 
paramilitary approach that played directly into the anti-government narrative of the 
Sagebrush Rebellion and the militia movement. Perhaps worst of all, they chose to retreat 
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in the face of aggressive tactics by the Bundy family and their militia supporters. Perhaps 
because they recognized the position they were in, they chose the presentational strategy 
of “keeping a low profile,” which amounts to controlling information and waiting for the 
storm of the crisis to pass.150 
D. CONSEQUENCES OF BUNKERVILLE 
While the authors of The Politics of Crisis Management argue prescriptively that 
political responses to crises involve five key elements—“sensemaking,” “decision 
making,” “meaning making,” “terminating,” and “learning”—the response to the crisis 
presented by the Bunkerville Standoff was largely focused around meaning making. The 
focus on meaning making was due to the fact that the political actors involved, 
particularly those who felt some blame risk associated with the event, were practicing 
political crisis management and not political crisis leadership. While this approach 
appears to have been largely effective with respect to blame management, it focused only 
on the events before and during the crisis and failed to allow these leaders to recognize 
what might come afterwards.  
For those involved in this event, very little could be referred to as “learning” from 
the crisis, as referenced in the model presented in The Politics of Crisis Management. 
Law enforcement agencies involved did conduct internal and confidential after action 
reviews, and legislation was presented in 2015 that would have addressed aspects of this 
crisis, but a body was not empanelled to suggest improvements or other typical 
approaches to learning for public agencies following crises. The real learning appears to 
have occurred within the radical militants who forced the government to retreat from 
Bunkerville after threatening violence, when they found they could defeat the 
government through force and rhetoric.  
The collision between federal, state, and local law enforcement and the militants 
at Bunkerville emboldened the anti-government forces. Federal law enforcement had 
faced off with militia members, and the militia members won. Just more than 18 months 
later, Ammon Bundy built on the success of the standoff in Bunkerville by initiating an 
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offensive occupation on the Malheur Federal Wildlife Refuge in Burns, Oregon.151 He 
and other members of the militia actually stated that they felt emboldened by their victory 
over the federal government in Nevada in 2014, and that it led to their actions in Oregon 
in 2016.152 Although two of the Bundy brothers were arrested and tried along with others 
for their involvement in the Burns occupation, they were found not guilty.153 This verdict 
may have emboldened them even further, but their future anti-government efforts will 
have to wait until five incarcerated male members of the Bundy family learn the verdict 
for their involvement in the Bunkerville standoff.154  
Those directly engaged in various levels of the Bunkerville standoff in April 2014 
could not necessarily predict how the militia members pointing rifles at them would act in 
the next minute, let alone the next 18 months. They had to govern, and operationally, that 
meant making decisions that avoided a bloodbath in the Nevada desert. However, as this 
case study shows, they chose to act through political crisis management and not political 
crisis leadership, prioritizing blame avoidance and operations during the crisis over more 
strategic concerns. Thus, they simply did not consider or even recognize the long-term 
implications of their actions and decisions that day. 
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III. LAS VEGAS POLICE AMBUSH: JUNE 2014 
On June 8, 2014, two assailants entered a pizzeria in Las Vegas, Nevada, and 
murdered two police officers. It was not only that they committed their act of violence 
during primary election voting that made this assassination a political act, but it was also 
immediately clear that they hoped to initiate an anti-government revolution through their 
assassination. Given the national climate regarding violence against law enforcement at 
the time and the local impact of the shocking violence, political actors from all levels 
responded. However, the fast-moving nature of this crisis changed the blame risk 
dynamic considerably, and therefore, the political response was different as well.  
Dramatic incidents like the daytime murder of two police officers in a major 
metropolitan area evoke many immediate questions both locally and internationally. Who 
were the assailants, and more importantly, what was their motive? Were their families 
and friends aware of their intentions, and did anyone assist them? And what did law 
enforcement know about them, and when? If these questions remain unresolved for a 
significant period of time, the subjects of the questions may experience blame risk, which 
may require efforts to manage any of the corresponding blame. 
Just as quickly as such questions arose, though, various commentators offered 
suggestions to fill the void. Former Nevada gubernatorial candidate David VanDerBeek, 
who ran on the anti-government platform of Independent American Party, which had 
long advocated against federal control of land within Nevada, had met with the murderers 
on numerous occasions at his campaign events, was quoted as saying that they “were 
simply insane people who wanted to kill.”155 Lydia Warren of the Daily Mail newspaper 
asserted that they were “white supremacists.”156 And John Hayward combined multiple 
theories to conclude that “they were drug-addled psychopaths with anarchist delusions 
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whose malfunctioning mental hardware led them to declare a ‘revolution’ and attack the 
police.”157 But these theories do not really withstand examination, as Jerad and Amanda 
Miller, a married couple ages 31 and 22, respectively, at the time of their attack on Las 
Vegas Metropolitan Police Department Officers Alyn Beck and Igor Soldo, had a lengthy 
history of radical anti-government sentiment prior to the incident.  
A. FAILED REVOLUTIONARIES  
Amanda Miller was born Amanda Woodruff in 1991 and raised in Lafayette, 
Indiana. According to reports, “she played violin and was a solid student at Jefferson 
High School.”158 She was a high-school graduate, she was able to hold a steady job, and 
she did not have a criminal record.159 Conversely, Jerad Miller was born in 1983 in 
Washington State, and according to one report, he was “the son of conservative 
Christians.”160 Another report stated that he “came from a very strict home,” and after his 
parents divorced, he moved with his mother to Indiana. Unlike Amanda, he was a high-
school dropout, and he had difficulty maintaining employment.161 Jerad also had a 
significant criminal record, which dated back to 2001 and included theft, driving under 
the influence, assault, various drug charges, and felony criminal recklessness for pointing 
a firearm.162 
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Jerad and Amanda Miller met in December of 2010, and on September 27, 2012, 
they were married.163 Over the course of the next two years, they radicalized together, 
culminating in their attempt at “revolution” in Las Vegas. Jerad’s radicalization appears 
to have coincided with his ongoing involvement with the criminal justice system, 
including court appearances, arrests, and stints in county jail. As documented on their 
personal Facebook pages, Jerad’s frustrations with the criminal justice system led him to 
an anti-government ideology that denounced the police state, the war on drugs, and other 
forms of government authority that he perceived as illegitimate, and eventually became 
an obsession for him.164 
Following Jerad’s release from jail in Indiana, the two drove to Nevada where 
they would start a new life. Following the murders, Amanda’s father, Todd Woodruff, 
“said he begged his daughter not to marry the man who was obsessed with far-right-wing 
movements like Patriot Nation,” the article reads.165 Woodruff eventually relented on 
their relationship, and he could not stop her when she and Jerad told her family that they 
were moving to Las Vegas. Woodruff is quoted in the article saying, “she said there was 
something out there, some movement she wanted to be a part of.”166  
In fact, they moved to Nevada “with plans to campaign for Independent American 
Party gubernatorial candidate David Lory VanDerBeek.”167 VanDerBeek held extreme 
political views, and the Independent American Party had long advocated against federal 
control of land within Nevada, among other conservative positions. Although 
VanDerBeek met the Millers several times, he noted in an interview after their terrorist 
attack, although they may have agreed generically on issues like federal overreach and 
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the police state, “after meeting me and listening to me, I am sure it was obvious to them 
that I was not violent.”168 
Jerad and Amanda Miller were both known to law enforcement during their time 
in Nevada, and in fact, they had frequent contact with the police. According to one report, 
they were stopped by law enforcement during their initial drive into Nevada for a minor 
infraction. Later, Jerad was questioned by police at one point for calling in a bomb threat 
on the Indiana Department of Motor Vehicles over a dispute.169 These interactions did 
not result in any further actions by law enforcement. 
On April 9, 2014, Jerad posted on his Facebook page that he and Amanda would 
be joining the Bundy family and militia members in the Bunkerville standoff, which they 
viewed to be the beginning of a brewing revolution. Jerad was interviewed by news 
outlets in the days following the BLM’s decision to discontinue the gather; he was 
photographed carrying a rifle and wearing military-type fatigues, and he watched as the 
militia members from all over the country gathered to defend what they saw as 
government overreach.170 After being at the militia encampment for only a few days, 
Jerad and Amanda were apparently asked to leave by members of the militia because of 
Jerad’s criminal history.171 In the comments of a YouTube video post about Bundy, Jerad 
expressed frustration at his rejection from the movement for which they had moved to 
Nevada to join.172 
Following their departure from the Bunkerville standoff, Jerad and Amanda 
Miller went back to Las Vegas where they were even more determined to carry out the 
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revolution they were denied in Bunkerville. On June 8, 2014, they entered a CiCi’s Pizza 
restaurant and executed Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department Officers Igor Soldo 
and Alyn Beck, who were eating lunch at the establishment. The Millers then dragged the 
officers’ bodies out of the booth where they were seated and left a swastika pin and 
draped a Gadsden flag, a symbol of the anti-government movement depicting a snake and 
including the words “Don’t Tread on Me,” over Officer Beck.173 They also pinned a note 
onto Officer Soldo declaring that he and his partner were the first casualties of their 
revolution.174 The Millers then went to an adjacent Wal-Mart store and engaged in a 
standoff with police that ended with three more dead, including both Millers, and a Good 
Samaritan named Joseph Wilcox, who had tried to intervene. The whole incident lasted 
from 11:21 to 11:59 in the morning.175  
From June 9 through June 24, Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department Sheriff 
Doug Gillespie and his staff made extensive efforts to keep law enforcement and the 
public informed of the events and the findings from the ongoing investigation. The 
Southern Nevada Counter-Terrorism Center, the state’s designated fusion center, released 
a homeland security advisory on June 9, and the Department held press conferences in 
the morning and in the afternoon.176 On June 11, the Department released additional 
information on the investigation.177 And on June 23, Sheriff Gillespie held an additional 
press briefing, where he discussed details of the incident, as well as the various 
investigations underway regarding the officer involved shooting.178 
One of Gillespie’s assistant sheriffs, Joseph Lombardo, was a leading candidate in 
the primary election then underway. Lombardo temporarily curtailed his campaign for the 
office immediately after the murders, stating, “out of respect to the officers’ families, and 
                                                 
173 Thorkildsen et al., Las Vegas After-Action Assessment: Lessons Learned from the Las Vegas 
Metropolitan Police Department’s Ambush Incident, 4. 
174 Ibid., 2–5. 
175 Ibid., 2–7. 
176 Ibid., 2. 
177 Ibid., 16. 
178 Ibid. 
 44
the entire department, I’m suspending campaign efforts through tomorrow’s election.”179 
Sheriff Candidate Larry Burns, who would be defeated by Lombardo in the general 
election, also suspended his campaign. Burns stated, “We lost two brave officers and an 
innocent bystander,” adding, “Our thoughts and prayers are with their families, friends, 
and colleagues, as well as everyone who was affected by this unimaginable act of 
violence.”180  
Several important political responses followed the attacks. The first was a rush to 
lump the Bunkerville participants in with the Millers as dangerous extremists. The day 
after the murders, Interior Secretary Sally Jewell noted to the media that the Millers were 
reportedly participants within the standoff. “It is very important to bring lawbreakers to 
justice,” Jewell said, referring not to the deceased Jerad and Amanda Miller, but to the 
Bundy family and the militia members who joined them in Bunkerville.181 
Carol Bundy, the wife of Cliven Bundy, denied any connection between the 
standoff and the police shootings, stating, “I have not seen or heard anything from the 
militia and others who have came to our ranch that would, in any way, make me think 
they had an intent to kill or harm anyone.”182 Ammon Bundy, Cliven’s son, noted that 
the Millers were kicked off the ranch after a few days during the standoff because their 
views were too extreme.183 
The Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department also responded with several 
internal measures. First, by initiating an internal investigation through its Critical Incident 
Response Team, and according to the Director of the U.S. Department of Justice’s Office 
of Community Oriented Police Services, Sheriff Gillespie also requested an official after-
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action report from the federal agency, in which the sheriff is commended for his 
transparency and collaboration.184  
In March 2015, after Lombardo had been elected sheriff of Clark County, 
replacing Sheriff Gillespie, he reflected on the shooting in an interview with a local 
newspaper, emphasizing his ongoing concern for “lone wolf” terrorist attacks like this 
one and the need to remain vigilant against them.185 Just more than a year later, the Las 
Vegas Metropolitan Police Department announced that 23 officers received the 
department’s Medal of Valor and Unit Meritorious certificates for responding to the 
threat posed by Jerad and Amanda Miller.186 
B. POLITICAL CRISIS LEADERSHIP AND IMAGE RESTORATION IN 
FAST-MOVING CRISES  
The blame risk for this attack and the response operations was different for this 
fast-moving crisis than for the slow-moving crisis at Bunkerville months prior. In this 
case, such official political entities as the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department 
perceived their blame risk to be relatively low, while other political actors who likely 
would not have been given a platform if not for these attacks perceived their blame risk to 
be higher. Due to these respective perceptions of blame risk, official political entities 
responded largely in ways that aligned with political crisis leadership, even rejecting 
negativity bias in some cases, while the political newcomers responded in ways that 
aligned with blame management as political crisis management. 
Since the event terminated so quickly, sensemaking and decision making were 
made at the tactical level. However, Sheriff Gillespie and his subordinate leaders were 
able to participate in meaning making for the event immediately after the fact, which 
allowed them to frame the events in terms of the tragedy within their community and 
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their continued commitment to ensuring public safety. Sheriff Gillespie’s press briefing 
on the morning of the attack provided basic details of the tragic event for the Las Vegas 
Community.187 At the press briefing the following day, Sheriff Gillespie, Assistant 
Sheriff Kevin McMahill, and Assistant Sheriff Joseph Lombardo provided additional 
details on the ongoing investigation and on the Department’s security posture.188 These 
press briefings provided a foundation for the hero narrative that would be reinforced 
when 23 members of their police force were honored with awards a year following the 
event. 
Sheriff Gillespie also participated in learning in a number of ways following this 
event. Conducting an internal investigation through the department’s Critical Incident 
Review Team was an important step in this process, but requesting an additional after-
action review from the Office of Community Oriented Police Services, an external 
federal agency, further reinforces the Sheriff’s commitment to organizational learning. 
Beyond organizational learning, which can also help other organizations learn, these 
efforts signal an organization’s commitment to transparency and accountable for the 
leaders involved, a step that reflects political crisis leadership and not political crisis 
management. 
Sheriff Gillespie was not the only leader who proved he was not influenced as 
much by negativity bias by taking affirmative steps. Sheriff Lombardo’s decision to 
suspend his campaign could be criticized as opportunistic, but because it aligns with the 
political crisis leadership and hero narrative established by Sheriff Gillespie throughout 
this crisis, Lombardo’s decision appears to be respectful and professional.189 Much like 
Mayor Giuliani was praised for his focus on the response and recovery from the 9/11 
attacks without obvious concern for the political implications, the current and future 
sheriffs were able to communicate poise and seriousness in spite of the potentially 
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shifting political landscape in which they were forced to operate. The fact that several of 
his opponents suspended their campaigns as well further supports Lombardo’s framing. 
Secretary Jewell’s statements following the event seem to be more opportunistic, 
actually aligning more with image restoration techniques than with blame avoidance. Her 
decision to engage in image restoration suggests that the Secretary of the Department of 
Interior, which oversees the BLM, felt some damage from the distribution of blame 
following the Bunkerville standoff only two months earlier. The murders of the Las 
Vegas Metropolitan Police Department Officers provided her with an opportunity to 
scapegoat the Bundys and their fellow militia members as anti-government radicals much 
like the Millers, thus justifying the paramilitary tactics used, and abandoned, during the 
cattle gather, and possibly to justify the BLM’s decision to use an aggressive law 
enforcement approach to the situation in Bunkerville months before. 
Due to the framing contest initiated by Secretary Jewell, members of the Bundy 
family responded to their association with the Millers immediately when asked, and 
sought ideological distance from the attackers. Carol Bundy’s statement regarding the 
peaceful nature of militia members who showed up to her defense during the standoff 
may appear absurd to some, but to those who believe in her family’s stand against the 
federal government, it may have helped to continue the narrative they established at 
Bunkerville. To their supporters, they were the victims of government overreach and they 
were fully right to respond the way they did, messages that align well with her statements 
following Secretary Jewell’s comments. 
Radical political actors who might have otherwise remained obscure felt some 
blame risk from the Millers’ ambush on law enforcement. Media coverage, as well as the 
finger pointing from such figures as the Secretary of Interior, provided them a platform 
they likely would have not had otherwise. They used these platforms to both avoid blame 
by association, or to continue reinforcing their preferred narratives.  
Former Nevada gubernatorial candidate David VanDerBeek and others simply 
sought to distance themselves from any of the blame. He stated that he had met the 
Millers at campaign events, but it was clear that they were not politically aligned. Gordon 
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Martines, a former Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department detective who was also 
running for Sheriff, stated that the Millers had become vocal advocates for his campaign, 
but that he had asked them to stop supporting him when he learned of Jerad’s criminal 
history.190  
C. CONSEQUENCES OF THE LAS VEGAS POLICE AMBUSH 
Beyond the murder of two peace officers and the impact these murders had on the 
Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department and the Las Vegas community, the 
consequences of this incident were not as pronounced as they were for the Bunkerville 
standoff. In a number of ways, however, the gains enjoyed by the militia members from 
the standoff were further solidified. Following the coverage of the police ambush, the 
militia narrative was further legitimized by the media, which was reinforced even more 
by the BLM carrying much of the residual blame for the event. 
Since Jerad and Amanda Miller had been present at the Bunkerville standoff, if 
only briefly, members of the Bundy family and the militia movement were allowed an 
opportunity to participate in the resulting blame game. The fact that the militia response 
was covered in media reporting allowed them to shape their narrative away from the 
radicalism of Jerad and Amanda Miller and further their message as standing against 
unjust government authority. That is, the militia members’ participation in the blame 
game legitimized them as political actors, if only marginally, a mantle they would carry 
forward into the Burns occupation in 2016.  
This narrative was advanced further through Sheriff Gillespie’s blame of the 
BLM in the standoff. Even though Secretary Jewell attempted to use the police murders 
in an attempt at image restoration, she had few opportunities to gain traction for this 
narrative as media interest flagged. Any chance for redemption for the BLM would have 
to come through the courts as members of the Bundy family and their fellow militia 
members were tried on charges for their roles in the Bunkerville standoff throughout 
2017.  
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IV. NORTHERN NEVADA FLOODS: WINTER 2016 
Starting in January 2017, northern Nevada experienced an unprecedented number 
of emergencies and disasters, most directly due to or related to major flooding events. 
Flooding in January saturated river basins in a drought-stricken region, while more major 
flooding in February hit communities throughout the northern part of the state as well. 
Climatologists had predicted both of these floods, and though the incident periods 
stretched longer than a week in each case, the actual periods of the greatest threats were 
brief, making these fast-moving crises.  
The 2017 floods in Nevada provide a different perspective on blame risk and 
political crisis management versus political crisis management than the Bunkerville 
standoff and the police officer assassination. As natural disasters, the events began as 
exogenous events, where the cause of the crisis was out of the purview and control of the 
elected officials. Although the exogenous nature of these floods reduced the initial blame 
risk for the officials, elected and appointed officials could still be held accountable for 
how government agencies responded to them. 
The floods also provide a different perspective with respect to the time pressures 
the crises placed on public officials. If Bunkerville represents a slow-moving crisis that 
developed over decades and continued afterwards, and the police assassination in Las 
Vegas represents a fast-moving crisis that terminated in 38 minutes, the 2017 floods in 
Nevada represent a crisis that was a combination of both a fast-moving crisis and a slow-
moving crisis. That is, while a great deal of focus was given to the fast-moving aspects of 
these crises, which were both successfully handled, both floods contributed to a slow-
moving crisis that developed in the Washoe County community of Lemmon Valley, 
which was built around what was once a dry lakebed.  
A. UNPRECEDENTED FLOODS 
On Monday, January 2, 2017, the Reno, Nevada, office of the National Weather 
Service changed its predictions of cold weather in the Sierra Mountains. Instead, a large 
“atmospheric river,” also called a “Pineapple Express” was likely to occur, which could 
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quickly bring large amounts of warm moisture into the atmosphere by the weekend.191 
Since large amounts of snow had accumulated in the Sierra Nevada Mountains in late 
December 2016, warm rain in the mountains could melt that snow and overwhelm the 
river basins below the Sierra, threatening the communities around them. The potential for 
flooding in early 2017 looked very similar to flooding that had occurred in the same area 
in 1997, and again in late 2005 and early 2006. 
With the news from the National Weather Service, local, state, tribal, and federal 
entities began preparing their respective communities. In addition to mitigation measures 
that had been underway for the Truckee River and other basins following the flood of 
2005 and 2006, public works and public safety professionals in all the communities 
worked to fill and distribute sandbags, and clear debris from the waterways.192 As water 
began pooling in populated areas, public officials also worked to inform the local 
populace ahead of the period of greatest threat.193  
The most intense flooding in the January storm was to hit the Truckee River 
system in and around Reno, in Washoe County, which contained the highest population 
in the affected area, on the evening of Sunday, January 8, and the morning of Monday, 
January 9.194 Communities in the affected areas worked hard to protect human life and 
property from damage from the flooding, especially as the various rivers were anticipated 
to reach peak flood stages in areas that were populated or had a concentration of 
businesses.195 Their efforts consisted of sharing public information, announcing sandbag 
locations for residents to emplace at their homes or businesses, and continue to deploy 
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teams from local, state, and tribal agencies to areas of concern.196 In all, the counties of 
Washoe, Douglas, Lyon, Storey, the Independent City of Carson City, the Reno-Sparks 
Indian Colony, the Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe, and the Washoe Tribe of Nevada and 
California declared states of emergencies and requested additional support and resources 
from the state.197 Governor Sandoval declared a state of emergency for all the counties 
and tribal governments in the affected area on January 7, 2017.198 
Although the primary focus was on the river basins, continued weather events in 
addition to the atmospheric river also contributed to damages. The weather damaged 88 
county roads and 20 state roads, residents in certain areas were asked to shelter in place, 
and debris removal efforts had to be initiated almost immediately.199 Throughout the 
entire period of the incident, the State Emergency Operations Center was activated, and 
was supported by a Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Incident 
Management Assistance Team, with local, state, and tribal resources exhausted, if only 
temporarily.200  
Perhaps the hardest hit community was the Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe, which is 
primarily located on three communities, Sutcliffe, Wadsworth, and Nixon.201 The tribe 
lost major lifeline services due to the flooding: floods washed out their drinkable water 
system, they lost electricity, their sewage system was overwhelmed, and State Route 446, 
which connected community members with healthcare and other services, was 
completely impassable.202 Overall, such destruction on the Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribal 
Reservation land, and throughout the counties and tribes in the affected area, resulted in 
nearly $14 million dollars in damages.203 
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Although the weather system persisted for more than a week, the period of highest 
threat remained when the Truckee River reached peak flood levels on Sunday evening 
and Monday morning. As this period marked the highest threat to life and property in the 
area, political figures appropriately seized the opportunity to comment on the recent 
events and the efforts to respond to them. Since the weather event was ongoing, these 
media engagements offered them an opportunity to continue to inform residents and 
visitors of the affected areas of the precautions that should be taken due to the ongoing 
threat. 
On Tuesday, January 10, 2017, various elected and appointed officials toured the 
damaged sites and commented on the success of local and state efforts to respond, and the 
need to stay vigilant going forward. Governor Sandoval noted that he was pleased with 
the work by local and state governments to prepare for and respond to this flood. “I think 
they did everything they could possibly do to try and anticipate what could happen,” he 
said, adding that he believed everyone did a “wonderful job.”204 City of Reno Mayor, 
Hillary Schieve, noted that even though the peak flood stage had passed, the river was 
still extremely high and urged residents to stay away for longer.205 Washoe County 
Manager, John Slaughter, also noted that he was pleased, but stated that the weather 
event presented challenges that they could not have foreseen.206  
On February 9, allowing time for damage assessment teams to conduct their 
analysis, Governor Brian Sandoval requested a Presidential Major Disaster Declaration 
from President Donald Trump.207 On February 17, 2017, President Trump approved the 
governor’s request for a declaration for Public Assistance and Hazard Mitigation, 
recovery programs managed by the FEMA.208 Before then, Nevada’s most recent 
Presidential Major Disaster Declaration was in 2014, when the Moapa Band of Paiutes 
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experienced severe flooding in Clark County; the next most recent Presidential Major 
Disaster Declaration was in 2008.209 On February 18, Governor Sandoval also requested 
that the U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) declare an administrative emergency 
to assist the private homeowners and business owners in the area through low-interest 
loans and other disaster programs.210 The SBA approved the disaster declaration on 
February 23.211 
Beginning around February 5, 2017, northern Nevada received another round of 
storms, this time spanning across the entire northern half of the state.212 As with the 
January flooding, this storm included heavy snowfall in the Sierra Nevada Mountains, 
transportation routes were closed, communities were isolated, and much like in California 
around the same time, dams failed. The weather was not as intense as in January, and 
many of the sandbags and other preparedness efforts remained in place, which, once 
again resulted in no loss of life or property.213  
Although the response to the February flooding was successful, it continued to 
stretch local, state, and tribal resources. Nevada’s Division of Emergency Management 
filled dozens of resource requests for the new event, the Department of Transportation 
and the Highway Patrol managed roadways and ensured safety throughout the region, and 
the Division of Forestry deployed inmate hand crews around the state.214 Initially, the 
Counties of Douglas, Elko, and Humboldt, as well as the Independent City of Carson, all 
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declared emergencies for the February event, and Governor Sandoval followed suit with 
a state declaration of emergency for this new event on February 10.215  
When the February flooding began to subside throughout the northern part of the 
state, statewide damage assessments began in earnest to establish whether federal 
indicators had been established for a second Presidential Major Disaster Declaration. The 
February floods were spread out over a much larger geographic area than the January 
flooding, and impacted the peak flood levels were not as dramatic. Also fewer publicized 
tours of flood preparedness sites and other damage areas were conducted by political 
leaders for the February flooding as well.  
B. A SLOW-MOVING SURPRISE 
Thus, by the second half of February, a second fast-moving crisis in as many 
months had been averted, and elected leaders were focusing their considerable influence 
and interest elsewhere. However, by the last week of February, early indications were 
beginning to show that another crisis loomed. More precisely, by the end of the month, it 
became clear that a profound, slow-moving crisis had emerged in the shadow of these 
two fast-moving and successfully managed crises. 
On February 23, 2017, the Washoe County Manager signed a declaration of 
emergency for his county for the February flooding event.216 Although the declaration 
cited that an emergency was declared for all areas of the county, news reports suggested 
that the most acute flooding was in the Lemmon Valley area north of Reno.217 Initial 
media reports described the once-dry lake-bed now filled with water, with 20 homes 
affected, road closures, and continued threats if the water rose.218  
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The situation in Lemmon Valley had been dramatic for several weeks prior to the 
County’s declaration of emergency.219 Not only was water slowly rising and getting into 
more homes, but septic takes were also becoming affected by the water, potentially 
contaminating the new body of water as it grew.220 Governor Sandoval signed an 
amended emergency declaration on March 2, 2017 to include the new Washoe County 
Declaration and the state’s potential request for a Presidential Major Disaster 
Declaration.221  
Governor Sandoval formally requested a Presidential Major Disaster Declaration 
on March 8.222 Like the January declaration request, the February declaration requested 
approval of the FEMA Public Assistance Program and the Hazard Mitigation Program.223 
Unlike the January declaration request, the governor also requested approval of the 
FEMA Individual Assistance Program for Washoe and Elko Counties, specifically citing 
Lemmon Valley in his request.224  
Within his request for a Presidential Major Disaster Declaration, the governor also 
requested direct federal assistance from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers for assistance 
with dewatering Lemmon Valley.225 The governor also authorized his state agencies to 
pursue advance measures for flood fighting from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers as 
well, which he supported through a letter of his own on March 8 as well.226 Both requests 
resulted in a site visit and an extensive report on potential solutions to the enormous 
challenge in Lemmon Valley, as well as an ongoing dialog with the federal agency during 
the recovery process.227 
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Governor Sandoval also engaged more heavily in the media aspect of the 
February storm event following the notification of the situation in Lemmon Valley. On 
March 3, Governor Sandoval visited the most heavily damaged area of Lemmon Valley, 
at which point the flood waters had been in homes and caused damage for two months.228 
“First and foremost, my prayers are with the residents out here,” the Governor said.229 
“This is horrible, it’s catastrophic, and it’s as bad as anything I have ever seen in the 
state,” he added.230 He referred to the crisis in Lemmon Valley as a “small Katrina” and 
noted that he and the resources of the state were available to help.231  
Governor Sandoval also issued a statement following the tour of the Lemmon 
Valley damages.232 After noting his sadness for the residents of the area, he stated that 
the state was “working with Washoe County, the lead for this event due to the location,” 
and that it would “continue to support the county’s efforts and the residents who are still 
suffering.”233 In this statement, he also noted that he had requested an extension from 
FEMA for the allowable time period to request a Major Presidential Disaster 
Declaration.234  
Following the governor’s visit, Washoe County hosted a community meeting for 
residents of the Lemmon Valley area.235 So many people were interested in the update 
that residents had to be turned away, and many of the residents able to attend expressed 
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frustration that they had not seen any action from the local government to help.236 These 
frustrations persisted through the end of the month, when additional meetings were 
held.237  
Part of this frustration from local residents in the Lemmon Valley area appeared 
to be coming from Washoe County’s messaging system. On March 8, the same day as the 
Governor’s request for a presidential Major Disaster Declaration, Washoe County 
Community Services Director, Dave Salero, noted that Mother Nature was to blame for 
the events.238 Regarding the solutions available to the county, he spoke of prioritization, 
“Would we spend $40 million dollars on 100 residents or would we spend it on parks, 
libraries and other residents?”239 At the community meeting at the end of March, Solaro 
increased his estimate for fixing the problem from $40 million to $100 million and 
suggested that the residents of Lemmon Valley would pay for that fix through monthly 
assessments.240 
By March 16, the county had initiated a flood fighting plan, which consisted of 
emplacing barriers between the water and the neighborhoods and pumping water back 
into the lake area. The Truckee Meadows Fire Protection District, the county’s fire 
service, had taken over the operational control of the incident.241 These efforts were 
supported by ongoing efforts at the state and federal levels, and would eventually require 
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legislation to be passed during the ongoing legislative session to repay the state’s 
emergency assistance account for all the emergency support provided.242  
On March 27, the president announced that a presidential major disaster had been 
declared for the counties noted in the governor’s request.243 Specifically, the governor’s 
request for approval of the public assistance and hazard mitigation programs were 
approved, but the request for individual assistance remained under review.244 The request 
for individual assistance would eventually be denied.245 
Also by late March, a new problem was evolving due to the floods in the northern 
part of the state. Governor Sandoval visited Fallon in Churchill County, which had 
declared an emergency ahead of massive runoff anticipated from the Sierra Nevada 
Mountains.246 The efforts in Fallon began in February and culminated in June with the 
completion of what they referred to as the “Big Dig,” a 17-mile canal that would divert 
the water coming into the community into the Lahontan reservoir, which was already at 
capacity.247 Based on the tremendous effort and expense that Churchill County and the 
City of Fallon, as well as other local organizations had put into this preparedness effort, 
the governor amended his previous declaration of emergency to include both Churchill 
and Storey counties.248  
With the ongoing threat of snow runoff potentially affecting communities that had 
already been damaged by floods in January and February, Governor Sandoval held a 
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public meeting to outline what had been done and what needed to be done going forward 
on April 13.249 With experts from various agencies represented, the group discussed with 
the governor what was known about the amount of snow and the potential for flooding in 
the various river basins within Nevada.250 During the briefing, Governor Sandoval noted 
that the response to the flooding would continue to be a “bottom-up approach,” which 
would start with local government and move to the state and federal government as 
additional resources were required.251 Following this meeting, the State of Nevada’s 
Division of Emergency Management and representatives from FEMA Region IX 
developed the “2017 Nevada Spring Flood Plan,” which served as a comprehensive plan 
for the floods that would follow.252 
On May 25, Governor Sandoval also requested a second SBA declaration of 
disaster for the February flooding as well.253 This disaster declaration was specifically 
requested for Washoe and Elko Counties due to the extensive damages that flooding had 
caused in each area.254 The SBA declared an administrative emergency on the same day 
as the request.255  
In addition to these initial requests, the governor continued his engagement 
through the declaration process. He requested that the incident period for the February 
declaration remain ongoing to include continuing response and preparedness efforts, and 
he appealed the denial of individual assistance for Elko and Washoe counties.256 Both 
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requests were denied.257 On May 12, the governor requested and received approval, 
however, to add Storey and Churchill counties to the Presidential Major Disaster 
Declaration for February, which was necessary due to the heavy snowpack in the Sierra 
Nevada Mountains and the full reservoirs in both of these communities due to the record 
floods.258 
Throughout the remainder of the summer of 2017, the situation largely stabilized. 
The water in Lemmon Valley did not evaporate as quickly as had been initially expected, 
which caused lingering concern. However, the preparedness efforts in places like 
Churchill County, Storey County and other areas averted major additional flooding, and 
potentially, an even more unprecedented third Presidential Major Disaster Declaration in 
a single year for ongoing flooding. 
C. AVOIDING HIDDEN BLAME 
Following the events of the major flooding in January and again in February, the 
posture of the political leaders suggested that these crises were relatively free of blame 
risk. Elected and appointed leaders were available to the media, they appeared together 
publicly, and they praised the efforts of their respective staffs. This unity and positivity 
likely resulted because these were fast-moving crises during which the government 
response was viewed positively, and no tragic losses of life occurred. 
However, hidden within these fast-moving crises was the Lemmon Valley crisis, 
which was a slow-moving crisis that offered extensive blame risk. Since the Lemmon 
Valley crisis was highly visible and media coverage continued throughout the period of 
the immediate crisis, government officials responded through presentational strategies to 
develop narratives that would frame their actions in ways that would help them avoid 
blame. Given the level of blame risk and the existing narratives going into this crisis, 
some narratives were more powerful than others. 
                                                 
257 Robert Fenton, “Robert Fenton to Brian Sandoval” (letter, May 17, 2017); Robert Fenton, “Robert 
Fenton to Brian Sandoval” (letter, May 22, 2017). 
258 Robert J. Fenton, “Nevada; Amendment No. 2 to Notice of a Major Disaster Declaration” (official 
memorandum, Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2017). 
 61
Governor Sandoval had the least blame risk in the Lemmon Valley flood crisis. 
The two floods in 2017 had been resolved quickly and well, and by the end of March, he 
would be able to take credit for ably managing unprecedented back-to-back Presidential 
Major Disaster Declarations. He had been out in the public, meeting with first responders 
and local officials, and communicating with the public about his actions and directions. 
Furthermore although the community had been dealing with rising water since January, 
he was only notified of the situation through the county’s declaration of emergency in 
late February.  
Though the governor was exposed to very limited blame risk, he did not fully 
engage in political opportunism; instead likely observing a limited form of negativity bias 
by visiting the residents of Lemmon Valley and engaging the media on their behalf. 
However, even without fully exploiting the situation for political gain, the governor was 
still able to use presentational strategies to ensure that his version of the narrative was in 
place.259 In visiting the Lemmon Valley community in early March, and through his 
media engagement from the event, he was able to develop the victim narrative for the 
community members, which was reinforced by his reference to Hurricane Katrina. 
Finally, he was able to establish that the responsibility for solving this issue was at the 
county level, with the state in full support, a statutory division of labor that also works to 
assign most of the blame risk to the county as well. 
By holding the public briefing in April to discuss all the ongoing flood 
preparedness efforts, the governor was able to continue to win the framing contest by 
emphasizing these same points. He noted that the state was remaining engaged, but that 
managing the crisis remained “bottom-up” efforts, meaning the counties and local 
governments remained responsible for solving the issues, and also for any of the ongoing 
failures. These public efforts corresponded with his extensive efforts to advocate for the 
people in Lemmon Valley through his appeals for support to the federal government. 
Even without the governor’s powerful narrative, the highest level of blame risk 
for the slow-moving Lemmon Valley crisis remained with Washoe County. Lemmon 
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Valley sits within the county, and Washoe County is responsible for providing public 
services to the area. While Washoe County had remained engaged in the flood 
preparedness and response efforts since January, a negative narrative about official 
engagement in Lemmon Valley had already developed by the time the county manager 
signed the emergency declaration on February 23.  
The county’s presentational strategies to establish their own narrative failed to 
take hold, as seen through the ongoing tense and contentious public meetings they hosted 
with the residents of Lemmon Valley. One reason for the county’s failure to establish an 
effective narrative regarding their efforts for the community, which were in fact extensive 
and costly, was the narrative chosen by county representatives and the solutions derived 
from that narrative. When the county representative was quoted as calling for “Mother 
Nature” to receive the blame, he may have lost the framing contest. Scholarship on 
framing contests suggests that narratives that blame things beyond the control of the 
officials, so-called “acts of God,” are not compelling to the public.260 The fact that the 
solution to fix Mother Nature’s failure was a local tax levied against the residents of 
Lemmon Valley to raise approximately $100 million dollars possibly only made this 
narrative less compelling. 
The county presented this exogenous narrative in a framing contest against the 
governor’s narrative, and it failed miserably. The people of the Lemmon Valley 
community had presented their frustrations through media outlets, and the visuals 
associated with the coverage were compelling. The governor’s narrative matched the 
local narrative and the media logic, allowing him to “win the argument.”261 
D. CONSEQUENCES OF THE 2017 NORTHERN NEVADA FLOODS 
The consequences of these floods and their administrative and operational 
responses continued throughout 2017, particularly for the residents of Lemmon Valley. 
Although Washoe County had successfully moved water out of homes and 
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neighborhoods, it remained in the dry lake bed and as an ongoing community flashpoint. 
By the fall of 2017, frustrated community members angrily contested a proposal for a 
new housing development in the area.262 Some in the community believed that a 
perceived rise in local illness was directly associated with the sitting water in the area.263 
As winter approached at the end of the year, many were concerned about preparations for 
a new round of storms that could bring more water to the area.264 While the community 
met these challenges, the most significant consequence was perhaps the broken trust 
between the residents and their community leaders. 
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V. FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
FOR POLITICAL CRISIS LEADERS 
The framework established in this paper argues for a distinction between political 
crisis leadership and political crisis management. Through the case studies examined in 
this thesis, the framework provides for a number of findings and conclusions regarding 
what factors contribute to elected and appointed officials’ decisions to be either crisis 
political leaders or managers, and what methods they use to do so. These findings and 
conclusions support a recommendation for political crisis leaders, namely, that they 
establish resilience narratives well before a crisis is underway. 
A. FINDINGS 
The case studies examined illuminate the actions of political leaders during crises, 
and particularly the factors that contribute to their decisions to be political crisis leaders 
or political crisis managers. In general, the perception of blame risk for the political 
official in question appears to be the single most significant factor in this decision, and 
blame risk is often associated with how quickly a crisis terminates. Furthermore because 
they are political officials and not first responders, their preferred method for either 
leading or managing through the event is often through presentational strategies, or 
efforts to establish an effective narrative to accomplish their political and operational 
goals.  
More specifically, in crises where the blame risk was perceived to be relatively 
low for certain public officials, the same officials were more likely to respond in a way 
that aligned with political crisis leadership. In these cases, such as the assassination of the 
police officers, and the first two floods of 2017 in Nevada, the fast-moving nature of the 
crises meant that the operational threat was neutralized quickly, and so was the political 
threat. Therefore, these political crisis leaders were able to develop positive narratives, to 
continue to govern, and unique to these instances, to ensure that organizational learning 
was formalized and continued well after the events concluded, as was the case with the 
sheriff’s after-action review and the governor’s public planning event for the floods. 
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During the crises where blame risk was perceived to be relatively higher for 
certain public officials, the same officials were more likely to respond in a way that 
aligned with political crisis management. In the cases where blame risk was much higher, 
such as the Bunkerville standoff, and the persistent flooding in Lemmon Valley following 
the January flood, political leaders deployed presentational strategies to develop 
narratives and engage in framing contests to avoid blame. Unfortunately, in the case of 
the Bunkerville standoff, this approach had operational implications, which emboldened 
the militia group involved, and led to a subsequent offensive occupation where a person 
was killed. In the Lemmon Valley flood, it meant that the slow-moving crisis persisted 
even 11 months after the declaration of an emergency.  
B. CONCLUSIONS 
These cases suggest that presentational strategies used to make meaning of the 
situation are the best method for political crisis leaders to achieve their goals of both 
governing and of avoiding blame. On one hand, these efforts to make meaning of the 
crisis allow them to explain to the public how the incident occurred, what is being done 
to stabilize the situation, and what will be done to ensure that such a crisis does not 
happen again. On the other hand, these same messages can be used to address the 
emotional nature of the event and provide hope for renewal in the future.  
In all the cases studied, elected and appointed officials showed their aptitude at 
meaning making during an event, though with exceptions. In the two most complex 
crises, the Bunkerville Standoff and the 2017 floods, successful political leaders managed 
to identify presentational strategies and narratives that showed the resources, decisions, 
and actions under their control in the best light possible. These approaches created 
powerful and convincing frames that blamed others when things went poorly and that 
praised positive collaboration when things went well. In both cases, the focus only on the 
response phase during the most acute period of the crisis allowed for the very different 
complexities in each crisis to be missed, though in both cases, blame had been fairly 
clearly established.  
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Also in both cases, the focus by political leaders across the spectrum largely 
ended when the perceived threat ended, except when blame could be attributed after the 
fact as with Sheriff Gillespie’s blame of both Bundy and the BLM, and Secretary 
Jewell’s image restoration strategy following the police assassinations. In both cases, any 
public efforts for organizational learning were limited at best. 
C. RECOMMENDATION FOR CRISIS LEADERS 
What appears to be missing from all these cases is a significant effort to frame the 
potential crisis before it is clear that such a crisis may be looming, which is an essential 
element for political crisis leadership. Leadership before the crisis can come in many 
forms, but efforts can largely be categorized as either governing or avoiding blame. As 
noted, both are required of political crisis leaders, and they are required throughout all 
phases of the crisis. 
Political crisis leadership as governing before a crisis occurs has been studied 
thoroughly. Largely referred to as “preparedness” within public safety and emergency 
management circles, leadership in this area can take many forms. Political leaders can 
ensure that specific threats and hazards for their jurisdictions are identified and their 
ability to respond to those threats assessed. They can ensure that plans are written, key 
personnel are trained against those plans, and that the training is exercised. These sorts of 
activities happen daily, often without input from political leaders, but political leaders can 
ensure that barriers are reduced between agencies, resources are available, and 
preparedness is and remains a priority. 
Research on political crisis leadership as blame management before a crisis 
occurs is not as robust. As these case studies show, blame management efforts prior to 
crises appears to be an area where even the most successful crisis management efforts 
were lacking. Effective political crisis leaders can avoid this challenge during crises by 
establishing resilience narrative that can be invoked and reintroduced as a renewal 
narrative during the crisis. 
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D. RESILIENCE NARRATIVES 
Focusing exclusively on blame risk during a crisis amounts to political crisis 
management. Political crisis leaders must focus on addressing their blame risk, as well as 
governing. To both govern and avoid blame, political crisis leaders must engage in the 
five essential tasks outlined in The Politics of Crisis Management before, during, and 
after the event. If presentational strategies provide political figures with their best 
opportunity to both govern and avoid blame, then they must establish narratives before 
crises that can be relied upon during and after the event is terminated. These narratives 
established prior to the event are referred as resilience narratives.  
In addition to the “postcrisis narratives of accountability, responsibility, and 
blame” common immediately following a crisis, “alternative narratives of growth, 
learning, rebirth, resurrection, restoration, and renewal” can also be found.265 In crises 
where “renewal narratives” are found, they can capture how a community decides to 
rebuild and reinvent itself following a crisis.266 It acknowledges the figurative and literal 
space for change and adaptation following an event like a major fire, flood, or otherwise, 
and looks to the future for growth and opportunity even through the community’s present 
suffering.267  
Renewal narratives, like all narratives during a crisis, have to be believable. They 
have to be framed correctly, and voiced by credible messengers as a part of a framing 
contest. Establishing the foundation for the renewal narrative, argued in this thesis as 
through establishing a strategic resilience narrative, is the essential task for the political 
crisis leader before a crisis both to govern and to avoid the risk of blame during and after 
an incident. 
The concept of strategic narratives is commonly found in the field of international 
relations. In Strategic Narratives: Communication Power and the New World Order, 
Alister Miskimmon, Ben O’Loughlin, and Laura Roselle define narratives as 
                                                 




“frameworks that allow humans to connect apparently unconnected phenomena around 
some causal transformation,” they include “an initial situation or order, a problem that 
disrupts that order, and a resolution that reestablishes order,” and “they articulate end 
states and suggest how to get there.”268 Based on this definition of “narrative,” they argue 
“strategic narratives are a means for political actors to construct a shared meaning of the 
past, present, and future of international politics to shape the behavior of domestic and 
international actors.”269 Furthermore they are “a tool for political actors to extend their 
influence, manage expectations, and change the discursive environment in which they 
operate.”270 
In Ordering International Politics: Identity, Crisis, and Representational Force, 
Janice Bially Mattern argues that “identity” is a nation’s key source of international 
order.271 In her argument, “identity is “the cognitive, sociological, emotional, and other 
nontangible bonds among states that constitute their roles in relations to one another and 
so endows states with a self-definition or concept.”272 Assuming a postmodern view of 
national identity, Bially Mattern argues that all identity is narrative, and that the identity 
or narrative breaks down in crisis, which provides an ideal “opportunity for exploring the 
process by which order is imposed upon disorder.”273 During a crisis, when identity is 
shaken and needs to be “re-produced,” Bially Mattern argues that narrators can do so 
through representational force.274  
According to Bially Mattern, representational force amounts to a “do-or-die 
command,” it is a “challenge so grave to a victim’s subjectivity that the victim ends up 
trapped in a position of either abandoning his dissent and complying with the demands of 
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the force-wielder or suffering subjective death.”275 In her example, she describes the 
Anglo-American Suez Crisis of 1956, in which a standoff between the two nations 
ensued, but was resolved without violence or threat of violence.276 It was the “special 
relationship” identities shared between the two countries that existed prior to the crisis 
and that had to be re-produced during the crisis that was the source of order for the two 
nations vying to be leaders of the western world.277 
In a publication of the Woodrow Wilson Center titled “A National Strategic 
Narrative,” Captain Wayne Porter and Colonel Mark Mykleby, provide an example of 
how the ideas presented in Strategic Narratives can apply ahead of and during crises, as 
described in Ordering National Politics. A National Strategic Narrative argues that the 
United States at the time of its writing (2011) remains dominant, but that the complexity 
of the 21st century world requires it to evolve to protect its key values of “security and 
prosperity.”278 To evolve with this changing world, the authors provide a new strategic 
narrative that reads, in the 21st century, the United States wants “to become the strongest 
competitor and most influential player in a deeply inter-connected global system, which 
requires that we invest less in defense and more in sustainable prosperity and the tools of 
effective global engagement.”279 While this statement may appear to be bureaucratic 
language and not a narrative, it embraces the key strengths that allowed for American 
dominance in the 20th century and shows how its needs to change to remain dominant in 
the 21st century. All an effective leader must do is create the story depicting this 
narrative. 
The authors of Strategic Narratives argue “leaders cannot create a narrative out of 
nothing, off the cuff.”280 The author of Ordering National Politics argues that identity 
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narratives prior to a crisis are the source of political order following the crisis if leaders 
use representational force to manage the crisis.281 In addition, the authors of “A National 
Strategic Narrative” assert that a strategic narrative is essential to leading the United 
States through the difficulties of an evolving world order.282  
If these three arguments about the strength of strategic narratives are true 
regarding international politics, then they should also be true about domestic politics. 
Therefore, with respect to these case studies, a crisis political leader ought to work to 
both govern and manage blame by establishing a strategic narrative that supports an 
identity of resilience for the community or jurisdiction for which they are responsible. 
This effort should be underway before crisis strikes, so that the strategic resilience 
narrative can evolve into a renewal narrative during and immediately following the crisis.  
With respect to crises, resilience is generally the ability of a jurisdiction, state, or 
even a country to recover quickly from a crisis of any kind. A strategic resilience 
narrative, then, is a set of facts about an entity’s history arranged to emphasize the 
challenges it has faced before and how it has overcome those challenges. If developed 
early within a political leader’s term, that is, prior to any crises, and if it is general 
enough, such a resilience narrative can be transformed into a renewal narrative if 
delivered through effective presentational strategies by a credible leader. 
While the “Boston Strong” slogan became a compelling rallying cry for the city 
and the entire nation following the Boston Marathon bombings in 2013, it was created 
after the city experienced the crisis and the lengthy manhunt.283 Perhaps the most 
compelling example of a resilience narrative was delivered by the great British orator and 
political leader, Winston Churchill. Although Churchill was just as capable of 
undercutting himself by his speeches in the British Parliament, he gave three speeches 
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that are famous today for how they reflected and cemented the British character of 
resilience at an extremely difficult time in his nation’s history.  
Churchill had assumed the role of Prime Minister of his country on May 10, eight 
months after the beginning of the Second World War, and during a time when his country 
faced considerable danger of a Nazi invasion.284 On May 13, he delivered his first of 
three speeches, which is commonly referred to as “Blood, toil, tears, and sweat;” on June 
4, he delivered his famous speech, “We shall fight on the beaches;” and on June 18, he 
delivered his speech entitled, “This was their finest hour.”285 
His second speech is perhaps his most famous. “We shall fight on the beaches” 
was delivered at a time when the United Kingdom was desperate. Nazi Germany was 
threatening to invade, and they required the assistance of American military forces to 
survive. This threat, presented an impending crisis, and recognizing that, Churchill 
concluded his speech with this paragraph: 
I have, myself, full confidence that if all do their duty, if nothing is 
neglected, and if the best arrangements are made, as they are being made, 
we shall prove ourselves once again able to defend our Island home, to 
ride out the storm of war, and to outlive the menace of tyranny, if 
necessary for years, if necessary alone. At any rate, that is what we are 
going to try to do. That is the resolve of His Majesty’s Government-every 
man of them. That is the will of Parliament and the nation. The British 
Empire and the French Republic, linked together in their cause and in their 
need, will defend to the death their native soil, aiding each other like good 
comrades to the utmost of their strength. Even though large tracts of 
Europe and many old and famous States have fallen or may fall into the 
grip of the Gestapo and all the odious apparatus of Nazi rule, we shall not 
flag or fail. We shall go on to the end, we shall fight in France, we shall 
fight on the seas and oceans, we shall fight with growing confidence and 
growing strength in the air, we shall defend our Island, whatever the cost 
may be, we shall fight on the beaches, we shall fight on the landing 
grounds, we shall fight in the fields and in the streets, we shall fight in the 
hills; we shall never surrender, and even if, which I do not for a moment 
believe, this Island or a large part of it were subjugated and starving, then 
our Empire beyond the seas, armed and guarded by the British Fleet, 
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would carry on the struggle, until, in God’s good time, the New World, 
with all its power and might, steps forth to the rescue and the liberation of 
the old.286 
Not only is the prose presented by Churchill famously beautiful and effective, but 
it also sets the conditions for a renewal narrative if the German military invaded. The 
British were resilient, and they have had to defend their Island before. As the common 
title states, Churchill was emphasizing the fact that they as a people were fighters and 
they would fight the enemy with everything they had in the event of an invasion. 
A leader does not have to be as effective an orator as Churchill, or even have the 
political stature to develop a strategic resilience narrative as he does. Every community, 
no matter the jurisdiction, has been through hardship before and has emerged, often 
stronger. This strength is the core of the strategic resilience narrative, a concept that 
leaders in each of these case studies ought to have practiced prior to their crises, just as 
each of the leaders should have practiced other elements of political crisis leadership in 
all the crises, whether they were fast-moving, slow-moving, or combination crises.  
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VI. #VEGASSTRONG: THE POLITICAL CRISIS MODEL AND 
RESILIENCE NARRATIVES APPLIED 
On the evening of October 1, 2017, an unknown gunman opened fire on an open-
air concert below his hotel room at the Mandalay Bay Resort and Casino in Las Vegas, 
Nevada, with initial reports indicating that dozens had been killed or wounded.287 The 
incident also took place at the beginning of the 2018 Governor’s race in Nevada, which 
coincided with other federal and state elections in the state. Due to the shocking nature of 
this massacre, the increased political activity associated with these political races, as well 
as the simmering national debate on gun control surrounding mass shootings, this crisis 
was immediately politicized.288 The complex operational and political dynamics 
associated with this event provide an opportunity to apply both the political crisis model 
described previously, as well as the resilience narrative concept. 
This incident took place as an audience of thousands took in the final set of a 
country music festival near the Las Vegas Strip, with video and updates painting partial 
pictures of a horrific scene. It happened in an iconic American city, and it would take 
hours for the full scale of the atrocity to be realized. But by the next day, the attack was 
dubbed, the “deadliest mass shooting in modern U.S. history.”289 
Important details of the incident were revealed in the hours and days that 
followed. With some important questions answered early on in the investigation, media 
outlets focused on determining the assailant’s or assailants’ motives, identifying any 
deficiencies in the coordination of the response between law enforcement, fire 
departments, and other agencies, and the role of the state’s relaxed gun laws in allowing 
such an atrocity to take place. Just as quickly, though, elected officials made intentional 
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efforts to frame the incident, including showing the responders and citizens who helped 
as heroes, depicting the fallen as victims of the attack, and showing Las Vegas as a city 
that would undoubtedly rebound from the devastation it endured. Whether these efforts 
were powerful enough to gain traction in the media reporting that followed determined 
whether elected officials felt blame risk or not, and therefore, engaged in political crisis 
leadership or political crisis management in the days that followed. 
A. THE DEADLIEST MASS SHOOTING IN MODERN U.S. HISTORY 
On October 1, 2017, at approximately 10:08 PM, an unknown gunman opened 
fire from his hotel room on the 32nd floor of the Mandalay Bay Resort and Casino onto a 
crowd below.290 Amateur videos posted on social media almost immediately after the 
attack show chaos as a massive crowd of people run from what sounds like automatic 
machine gunfire.291 Although information developed slowly during the perilous response 
effort, it was immediately clear that this event was a major attack on one of the world’s 
most iconic cities. 
Initial details of the attack emerged through a series of press conferences held by 
Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department Sheriff Joseph Lombardo shortly after the 
incident. The crowd was estimated at over 22,000 people, all of whom were participating 
in the Route 91 Harvest Festival, a three-day, outdoor country music festival held near 
the Las Vegas Strip.292 The shooter’s room was on the 32nd floor of the Mandalay Bay 
Resort and Casino that made it possible for him to shoot downward on the dispersing 
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crowd.293 He had broken out two windows on opposite sides of his suite that allowed him 
to change his shooting positions as the crowd moved.294  
Although his name was not released immediately, he was eventually identified as 
Stephen Paddock. His girlfriend, Marilou Danley, was identified as a person of interest, 
though it was later revealed that she was out of the country at the time of the attack.295 
Although he had incited untold terror on a crowd of people, it was initially unknown if 
Paddock acted alone, adding to the fear and insecurity in the city as the situation 
remained dynamic.296 
In the days prior to October 1, it was clear Paddock had meticulously prepared for 
his attack. Unknown to hotel staff, he brought 23 guns into his hotel room, and fitted at 
least 12 of the guns with “bump stock” devices that transformed his assault rifles into 
automatic weapons.297 He also set up a system of cameras in his room and in his hallway 
outside his room, presumably so he could know when police were poised to disrupt his 
attack.298 The cameras were helpful, apparently, because Paddock killed himself while a 
Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department SWAT team breached his door.  
Although it would take hours for the full scale of the attack to be reported, and 
when they were, it was clear that the results of his preparations were massive. The attack 
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resulted in 59 dead, including Paddock, and 489 were injured.299 Paddock fired on the 
crowd for approximately 11 minutes in total before he was stopped by hotel security and 
law enforcement.300 
While emergency responders neutralized the threat posed by Paddock and 
evacuated casualties, the administrative and support response initiated as well. Clark 
County approved an emergency declaration and activated its Multi-Agency Coordination 
Center to coordinate information and resources for the response efforts.301 The State of 
Nevada activated its Emergency Operations Center as well.302 Governor Sandoval 
declared both a public health emergency to allow for reciprocal licensure to out-of-state 
medical professionals traveling to Nevada to assist with casualties, and also declared a 
general state of emergency to ensure that state resources were available for Clark County 
as necessary.303 
Clark County moved quickly from the enormously successful response into 
recovery efforts. Under the county’s leadership, a Family Assistance Center was 
established to provide comprehensive services for victims and their families.304 The 
Clark County Coroner’s Office began the difficult work of victim identification, 
notification, and transportation.305 Clark County Commission Chairman Steve Sisolak 
even created a GoFundMe account that raised over $8 million for the victims and their 
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families in a few days.306 The hash-tag “#VegasStrong” became a common occurrence 
on social media.307  
B. APPLYING THE POLITICAL CRISIS MODEL 
Though many of these details are now known, media and the public had numerous 
questions about the attack for days after the event. What were Paddock’s motives? Why 
were “bump stocks” legal if they could cause so much destruction? Did Paddock have an 
accomplice? Did coordination between police and fire agencies successfully prevent 
stopping the threat once it had started? Although each of these questions and others 
would reveal more answers about an unprecedented act of violence on Nevada’s largest 
city, depending on how the questions were answered would determine who carried some 
of the blame for the attack. 
Through a series of press conferences, Nevada’s elected officials began to address 
these questions and shape the public’s perception of the mass casualty event. Although 
the press conferences began small, with only the sheriff, the Clark County Fire 
Department Chief Greg Cassell, and Aaron Rouse, the Special Agent in Charge of the 
Las Vegas Office of the FBI, they grew into political affairs with increasingly more 
elected officials on the stage and offering remarks at each additional press conference. 
The culminating press event had more than 30 people on the stage, 10 of whom were 
elected officials, including the President of the United State States.308  
During all the press conferences hosted by Sheriff Lombardo, the first of which 
was held within three hours after the attack, he and his immediate subordinates focused 
their remarks on the facts of the investigation as it developed, as well as on the heroic and 
combined efforts of the law enforcement, firefighters, emergency medical services, and 
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private security guards.309 Joined at the initial press conferences by Clark County Fire 
Department Chief Greg Cassell, Sheriff Lombardo spoke of police and firefighters not 
hesitating to pair up and enter the hotel together, a fact, he noted, that was not the case in 
responses to mass shooting events in every jurisdiction in the country.310 “Individuals 
with helmets and vests on,” Sheriff Lombardo noted during a later press conference, 
referring to pictures produced on social media, “those are firefighters.”311 He also later 
noted that Paddock’s room was discovered by a hotel security guard who had been shot at 
by the gunman before notifying police of the shooter’s location.312  
Sheriff Lombardo also addressed rumors as they arose during the press 
conferences. In the early hours of the investigation rumors suggested that Paddock had 
been assisted by another assailant in carrying out this attack. In an interview following 
the 2014 murder of two police officers in Las Vegas, Lombardo stated that his biggest 
fear for his community was an attack by a “lone wolf” actor.313 Based on his 
understanding of events, it appeared that his fear was realized, as no signs could be found 
of an accomplice assisting Paddock in carrying out his attack.314 
As the number of politicians on the press conference stage grew, the politics of 
this attack on Nevada’s largest city emerged, especially as they pertained to the beginning 
of the 2018 race for governor. Present for most of the press conferences were both the 
announced democratic candidate for Governor, Chairman Sisolak, and the Nevada 
Attorney General, Adam Laxalt, who was expected to announce his bid for the 
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Republican nomination for governor, but had cancelled his events due to the attacks.315 
Both officials stood on the stage and addressed the concerning situation facing the state, 
but some tension was noticeable. During an early press conference, Sisolak spoke first, 
but after Laxalt finished his remarks, Sisolak cut off the governor who was to speak next 
and offered additional remarks, asking everyone to thank first responders for risking their 
lives during the attack.316 Although a minor event and could be interpreted a number of 
different ways, as time carried forward, the politics of this incident were easier to 
identify.  
Many questions were answered through the various press conferences; however, 
two highly political questions remained. Namely, what were Paddock’s motives, and why 
“bump stocks” were legal. As these questions remained unanswered, and because the 
incident was already highly politicized, both questions led to separate political tempests 
in the days that followed.  
Speculating briefly on Paddock’s motives during a press conference, Sheriff 
Lombardo asked rhetorically if Paddock might have been radicalized, a question that 
coincided with an announcement from the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) that 
Paddock had converted to radical Islam six months prior to the shooting. This sole 
question was enough for far-right media outlets to hint at conspiracy theories, with Alex 
Jones’ website leading with a story about the Sheriff’s question.317 Wayne Allyn Root, a 
Las Vegas businessman, media personality, and avid Donald Trump supporter, concluded 
from the sheriff’s question and ISIL’s claim that Paddock was either a radical Muslim 
convert on or a radical member of leftist group, ANTIFA.318 FBI Special Agent in 
Charge Rouse stated plainly during a press conference that no evidence was found of a 
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connection with the radical Islamic group, though the investigation to Paddock’s motives 
was ongoing.319 
Questions about the legality of the “bump stock” pushed the debate into the larger 
public debate on gun control. One article stated that Nevada’s lax gun laws had made it 
easy for Paddock to commit his attack.320 An article in the Nevada Independent revealed 
that a gun control advocacy group had threatened to sue the state because of Attorney 
General Laxalt’s refusal to implement a ballot measure approved by Nevada voters 
during the previous election that would require background checks for private gun sales. 
And on Wednesday, October 4, the New York Times editorial board wrote a scathing 
editorial against Laxalt, stating that the rationale used to not uphold the will of the voters 
“comes from a man who not only campaigned against the proposal but later praised the 
N.R.A. at the organization’s annual convention in April for fighting sensible gun-safety 
laws.”321 The incident created such a controversy that Politico reported some 
Republicans in the Senate were ready to vote on some modest gun control measures, 
including outlawing “bump stocks.”322  
Following the culminating conference that included the president, Sheriff 
Lombardo continued to hold updates for the media and public. Hard questions, politics, 
and stories of heroism and resilience persisted through the reporting. But in the next press 
conference following the president’s remarks in Las Vegas, Sheriff Lombardo was one of 
three elected officials standing on the stage. 
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C. POLITICAL CRISIS LEADERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT 
The blame risk for this attack and the response operations were different than for 
the slow-moving crisis in Bunkerville in April 2014 and similar to the fast-moving crisis 
of June 2014, when the Millers assassinated two police officers. In this incident, blame 
risk was perceived to be low for the responding agencies, while some political actors, 
especially those engaged in political campaigns, perceived their blame risk to be higher 
as the issue played out. These perceptions of blame risk help explain, at least in part, why 
some political leaders exhibited clear examples of political crisis leadership while others 
engaged in political crisis management. 
For a number of reasons, the blame risk associated with the actual event was 
perceived by Sheriff Lombardo and Governor Sandoval to be relatively low, which may 
have contributed to their examples of political crisis leadership. First, the threat 
terminated in about 11 minutes from when it started, which, while perhaps a lifetime for 
those involved, was actually extremely fast. Second, although it was a deadly tragedy, the 
threat was neutralized and the scene was stabilized extremely effectively and quickly. 
And third, leaders like Sheriff Lombardo and Clark County Fire Chief Greg Cassell were 
able quickly and accurately to engage in meaning making to both inform the public and 
develop a believable and powerful narrative of heroism that proved to be dominant in the 
days that followed. 
The Sheriff exhibited political crisis leadership by both governing and managing 
blame through his press conferences that were held quickly after the attack and 
throughout the response period. These press conferences were exceptional tools for 
sharing sensemaking and meaning making. The many unknowns of the incident evoked a 
number of questions in the public, and leaving those questions unanswered would have 
allowed for rumors and unofficial information to fill the gaps in the public understanding 
of these events. The sheriff and his colleagues aggressively communicated both the facts 
of the case, as well as how the public should perceive those facts.  
The facts developed over time, but they were presented openly and steadily. As 
Sheriff Lombardo learned of new details that would help the public understand the 
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situation, and thus further understand that the threat was no longer present, he shared 
what he could, and demurred where he had to so as to preserve the investigation. 
Although the story changed over time, Sheriff Lombardo received praise for his even 
approach to information sharing during this dynamic event.323 
During the press conferences, the sheriff was also able to engage in meaning 
making strategies for the incident, which were extremely successful. Lombardo’s primary 
narrative was a hero narrative, specifically with respect to the first responders who 
engaged in this event, putting their life and safety at risk to do so.324 A part of this 
narrative was the successful joint efforts between police and fire responders, which the 
national media referred to as “a new approach” that resulted in saving lives.325 This 
narrative was effective because it aligned with a significant media narrative that 
developed around the same time. 
Governor Sandoval also could have perceived ownership of some of the blame 
risk; however, his actions suggest a rejection of negativity bias and full political crisis 
leadership, as well. Governor Sandoval served as Chairman of the Nevada Commission 
on Homeland Security, which oversees grants and strategy for statewide homeland 
security efforts, and he is generally responsible for public safety in the state, both 
positions that link him to this event. As is appropriate for the state’s chief executive, 
though, much of his leadership was shown through meaning making, and his words 
throughout the event proved to be as powerful as the sheriff’s in setting the tone of the 
narrative that the media would embrace. 
From his first tweet of the incident, the governor evoked the phrase “the Nevada 
family,” a theme that continued throughout his remarks in the week that followed. This 
imagery showed Nevada as a tight-knit community during a crisis. It suggested that no 
matter their day-to-day differences, the citizens of Nevada would come together during 
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the crisis, and thanks to the heroes described by Sheriff Lombardo, Nevada would come 
back stronger from this tragedy. 
Governor Sandoval’s comments evoked several narratives, but his most persistent 
contribution to meaning making for this incident was the creation of a powerful renewal 
narrative.326 The authors of Narratives of Crisis describe a renewal narrative as a 
message that assures the public that the community will come back just as strong or 
stronger than before.327 The governor relied on his use of the “Nevada Family” imagery 
to build out the components of his renewal narrative. He noted that the community had 
been hit hard, that heroes had stepped up, and that Nevada would come back from this 
event.328  
The governor’s final speech before introducing the President in Las Vegas 
perfectly exemplified the culmination of this message as it developed over the previous 
days.329 He spoke of anger and sadness, as he had all along, but he also spoke of 
resilience and strength.330 His message was a continuation of his statements on the 
incident from the very beginning, and at least one commentator remarked that he looked 
presidential making it. 
Governor Sandoval’s development of a renewal narrative for this event may have 
resonated because of similar messaging going out on social media. The Las Vegas 
Convention and Visitors Authority (LVCVA) posted a picture on various social media 
sites reading, “We’ve been there for you during good times. Thank you for being there 
for us now.”331 Another LVCVA picture posted on social media stated that the terrible 
incident that happened in Vegas was also inspiring because of the outpouring of support 
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received.332 Both were concluded with the hash-tag “#VegasStrong,” which recalled the 
“#BostonStrong” motto that developed after the Boston Marathon attack in 2014.333 
Chairman Sisolak and Attorney General Laxalt behaved much more in line with 
the characteristics of political crisis managers during this event. Chairman Sisolak’s 
blame risk came from his role as the Chairman of the Board of County Commissioners 
for the county government that headed up the response. Attorney General Laxalt’s role in 
the response was unclear; however, his advocacy for gun rights would be brought into 
sharp focus for the electorate with this event. The blame risk for both was heightened 
even further as they prepared to participate in the governor’s race. 
However, to say that they were both exclusively participating in the response to 
this event as political crisis managers would not be fair. By all accounts, Clark County 
under Chairman Sisolak’s leadership responded extremely well to the attack. The police 
and fire services stabilized the scene quickly, the county approved a declaration, and all 
aspects of the local government contributed to a well-coordinated efforts. Sisolak further 
showed his engagement by appearing at the press conferences, by continuing the hero 
narrative established by Sheriff Lombardo, and by taking the initiative to establish the 
GoFundMe account to receive contributions, which topped $8 million in the first few 
days. 
All these efforts show an intentional eschewing of negativity bias; particularly 
true, however, for his involvement in establishing the account for the victims, an 
innovative idea for a public official, but one fraught with political liability. If any hint of 
malfeasance was associated with this account, or if victims were reported to having to 
deal with unnecessary bureaucracy to access this account, Sisolak could find himself with 
another political crisis on his hands. Certainly, he considered this liability, but he still 
chose pursue political crisis leadership in starting the account. 
Attorney General Laxalt showed a similar willingness to eschew negativity bias 
and show leadership during the events and afterwards. He arranged to have a team of 
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attorneys general from other states with experience in victim advocacy come to Nevada 
to support Clark County’s efforts.334 Much like Sisolak’s victim account, Attorney 
General Laxalt’s efforts to assist victims opened him up to complaints from victims, but 
he chose to participate anyway. Laxalt also showed leadership during this crisis by 
postponing his campaign announcement for governor, a step that could damage any 
momentum he might have had gained by making the announcement as planned on 
October 2. 
The examples of political crisis management for the elected leaders were more 
subtle. As presumed opponents from opposite parties for the office of governor, they 
never addressed the public together to show they were working together and not allowing 
politics to interfere. While this may have been an extraordinary political step to begin 
with, there were examples of the perceived tension between the two. During the press 
conference on the morning of October 2 where both spoke, Sisolak insisted on speaking 
for a second time after the attorney general spoke, even cutting off the Governor to do so.  
Laxalt played politics as well. After Chairman Sisolak had achieved incredible 
success through his GoFundMe account, Attorney General Laxalt released a statement 
through his office warning people not to be taken in by scams where people used 
GoFundMe accounts to solicit money that would never reach the victims.335 His largest 
political donor in the previous election, Sheldon Adelson, also created a competing fund 
with Sisolak’s, and he donated $4 million dollars to it.336 
Even Laxalt’s efforts exhibiting political crisis leadership can be seen as blame 
avoidance strategies, particularly since he had no formal role in the response. As is often 
the case with mass shootings, the topic of gun control entered the discussion surrounding 
the Vegas assault and presented a new and lingering element of blame risk, especially for 
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Laxalt. His actions to override the will of the Nevada voters in halting the voter-approved 
ballot measure on gun background checks allowed his opponents to saddle him with the 
perception of blame for this event, even though the law he held up would not likely have 
had an impact on Paddock’s ability to purchase guns legally. With state and federal 
legislators introducing gun control measures and even the New York Times editorial board 
attacking his position directly, he needed to take steps to show he was part of the 
solution. Assisting the victims provided him a way to do that by invoking the victim 
narrative.337  
D. APPLYING RESILIENCE NARRATIVES 
The political scrum from this tragedy helped shape the way that the public of 
Nevada and perhaps the world understood this event. A prominent political commentator 
in Nevada, Jon Ralston, who has been critical of Governor Sandoval’s constant optimism 
in the past, spoke highly of the governor and of Sheriff Lombardo’s handling of this 
event. To Ralston, Governor Sandoval looked “presidential,” and Lombardo was “a no-
nonsense leader,” and “a consummate pro.”338 While others politicized these events, 
according to Ralston, these officials led.339 
Together, Lombardo and Sandoval reflected the leadership the public needed. 
Lombardo’s attention to updating the public with what had happened and what was 
currently happening as the investigation developed filled much of the official information 
void, while Governor Sandoval’s remarks focused on filling the emotional void for the 
residents and visitors of his state. Lombardo’s themes of heroism, vigilance, and tragedy 
well complemented Sandoval’s themes of sadness, anger, and renewal. 
Governor Sandoval’s remarks before introducing President Trump on October 5, 
2017, not only presented a renewal narrative, but they were based on a resilience 
narrative that he had been developing since his first public address as governor on his 
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first day in office. From his first inaugural address on January 3, 2011, through his final 
State of the State address on January 17, 2017, Sandoval had six major opportunities to 
address the people of Nevada on his vision and plans for his state. While resilience was 
not the only theme of these speeches, it figured prominently into each, setting the 
foundation for the renewal narrative that he would present to the public on October 5, 
2017.  
Sandoval’s first of two consecutive terms began in 2011, and he assumed 
leadership of one of the hardest hit states in the Great Recession of 2008.340 Against this 
backdrop, Sandoval recognized that his state had been through hard times before, but he 
noted that “character is measured in times of crisis.”341 During this short speech, 
Sandoval also described his own humble beginnings and the hope that Nevada had 
offered him, which allowed him to establish himself as the proper person to lead Nevada 
out of its difficult times. “The Nevada I know will choose action, courage, and 
opportunity,” he said.342 “We will choose optimism.”343 
Weeks later, on January 24, 2011, Sandoval seized the opportunity to build upon 
the message of his inaugural address and provide key verbiage for his vision through his 
first State of the State address. In this address, Sandoval introduced a persistent image of 
what he called “the Nevada family” to embody the themes he emphasized: shared 
sacrifice, common purpose, and optimism.344 Through the image of the Nevada family, 
he established the foundation for the resilience narrative he invoked following the mass 
shooting in 2017. 
The Nevada family was present the night of his first State of the State address, 
Sandoval noted, not just in the audience of the legislative chamber, but it was also 
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watching his remarks on television or in other ways.345 “It is as if the collective Nevada 
family has gathered around the table—each member leaning forward in his or her chair, 
eager to hear the news,” he said.346 “In this time of sacrifice, our Nevada family looks to 
us for reassurance, for solutions, and for leadership.”347 
Through referencing the Nevada family, Sandoval was able to frame the shared 
sacrifice as the necessary result of their shared crisis. “As our family gathers tonight, 
Nevadans are confronted on all sides with bad news,” he said.348 Friends of the family 
had experienced financial ruin, family members had lost jobs, foreclosures and closed 
businesses fill communities, and a lack of access to healthcare only promises more 
anguish.349 But, according to Sandoval, the answer to these struggles was not more 
government spending, but shared sacrifice for all members of the family.350  
This shared sacrifice began with the government’s budget, Sandoval said, adding, 
“Like any Nevada family or business, we began the budget process by looking at how 
much money we had to spend, not at automatic spending increases.”351 His budget and 
policy proposals unveiled that evening would include cuts to state employee pay and 
benefits, reductions in support to public and higher education, new efficiencies in health 
and public safety budgets, and the redirection of services previously supported by state 
funds to cities and counties.352 In his effort to match Nevada’s public spending with its 
revenue, the governor noted that he was not taking a conservative or a liberal approach, 
but that he was introducing major reforms to the way the state did business as well.353 He 
proposed dramatically changing the state’s policies and systems for economic 
development, education, and government responsiveness to focus the state’s efforts on 
                                                 










addressing Nevada’s abysmal unemployment rates.354 In outlining his proposals to 
overhaul Nevada’s government functions in these areas, he mentioned the “New Nevada 
Task Force,” which hinted at the “new Nevada” phrase that would recur throughout his 
future speeches.355 
To accomplish his vision of a new Nevada, Sandoval called for unity around the 
common purpose he proposed. As if foreshadowing the Las Vegas mass shooting in 
2017, Sandoval invoked the shooting of Congresswoman Gabrielle Giffords, a judge, and 
innocent bystanders days before his speech in Arizona.356 In Nevada, he said, “terror will 
not keep us from putting service above self, from treating each other with civility, and 
from working together to ensure public confidence in state government.”357 Nevada 
would, he proposed, form a more responsive government by, in part, marrying the state’s 
budget to its performance, creating oversight to detect instances of government waste, 
and streamlining the professional licensing process in the state.358 He concluded his call 
for unity around a common purpose by stating, “The Nevada family expects us to 
succeed by working together.”359 
Throughout his first State of the State address, Sandoval emphasized optimism for 
Nevada’s future even though it was experiencing hard times. Like Churchill during 
World War II, he noted Nevada’s heritage of resilience, stating that the state “has a long 
history of economic peaks and valleys,” and that even though the current crisis was worse 
than had been experienced before, his plan and their unified efforts could ensure that 
Nevada’s best days were yet to come.360 He concluded his address in a way that brought 
all his themes together through the Nevada family image and set the foundation for the 
resilience that would be necessary for renewal: 
                                                 








My fellow Nevadans, I have no doubt that together we are changing the 
course of history. We are leading the Nevada family onto a new path, and 
I submit that it is one of progress and ultimate prosperity. If we have the 
courage to make the tough decisions, and there will be many, we will 
succeed. If we focus on new solutions that fundamentally change the way 
we do business, we will succeed. If we make supporting private sector job 
creation a way of life for all government agencies… if we control state 
spending… if we push forward with education reform… if we recognize 
that service above self is a way of life… if we do all of these things 
together, then truly Nevada will be Nevada again.361 
The tone of the governor’s second State of the State address on January 16, 2013, 
shifted dramatically from his first in 2011. Instead of the bleak crisis he addressed in 
2011, he provided upbeat evidence of the result of their shared sacrifice, common 
purpose, and optimism. Due to the progress made, the themes of his second address 
shifted slightly as well, to “improvement, realism and yes, optimism.”362  
“The recession has hurt the entire Nevada family,” the Governor said, referring to 
the results of the shared sacrifice he called for in his first speech, but things had 
improved.363 When he had taken office, “Nevada led the nation in unemployment, 
housing foreclosures, and personal bankruptcies.”364 During his first State of the State 
address, the Governor said, “I asked the Nevada family to embrace a fundamental course 
correction—to leave behind the limits of the past and consider the case of our state’s 
future anew.”365 The challenges the state faced at that time insisted that Nevada’s leaders 
work together to address them, he said, concluding, “And we rose to the occasion.”366  
Although the state had achieved some recent successes, he noted, “our task is far 
from over.”367 Through his remarks he called for realism, asserting that even as the 
economy was improving, it was not time to simply reinstate funding and programs that 
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had been diminished during the most difficult part of the recession.368 Instead, his vision 
of realism called for a strategic investment in people, programs, and infrastructure that 
met the needs of the evolving economy.369  
The governor concluded his remarks by continuing his call for optimism, even if 
he tempered his remarks with caution. “Tonight, we can take pride in our progress,” he 
said.370 “The table has been set by economic improvements, and we can now see a light 
at the end of the tunnel.”371 However, Nevada as a whole would have to continue to work 
together to meet the persistent challenges that they faced.372  
“Two years ago we gathered in difficult and confronted a time of triage,” the 
Governor said in his conclusion.373 “Tonight, we come together to further stabilize our 
state and lay a stronger foundation for its future.”374 Their work together during that 
session, he said, would “reveal a map of promise and opportunity.”375 
In January 2015, Governor Sandoval delivered his second inaugural address after 
winning a resounding victory for a second term as the state’s GOVERNOR. Because the 
setting was one of celebration and not of policy development, the governor’s remarks 
during his inaugural address were full of aspiration and hope. However, they were not 
merely encouraging words, they reflected the themes he had developed in his previous 
major speeches, but they also reflected a culmination of the resilience narrative he had 
developed previously into a renewal narrative, rallying his fellow Nevadans toward the 
full realization of a better future.376 
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Sandoval used three examples of Nevadans to establish his vision of Nevada 
ahead of his second term. He quoted Sarah Royce, a young woman crossing Nevada with 
her family from Council Bluffs, Iowa, by wagon in 1849 to discuss the hardship that 
Nevada had endured in the past, he quoted former governor Paul Laxalt, who was both 
Sandoval’s political mentor and the grandfather to the current attorney general, Adam 
Laxalt, in describing the significance of why they were gathered there that day, and he 
highlighted the children of Nevada participating in the inauguration ceremonies as the 
future for whom he and his government would be committed to creating a better 
Nevada.377 The examples he chose suggested that though times had changed, the themes 
of his second term would be consistent with those of his first term. 
“A sense of destiny and promise runs deep in this land,” said Sandoval before 
introducing a diary entry from a young Sarah Royce in 1849.378 Crossing the Nevada 
desert, she notes that her family arose to make the final distance of the Nevada desert in 
front of them, and then the treacherous Sierra Nevada Mountain beyond the desert. “That 
feeling that we were once more going forward, instead of backwards,” Royce writes, 
“gave an animation every step, which we could never have felt but by contrast.”379 In the 
desert heat, Royce notes the fear and uncertainty of her travel ahead, stating that her 
family “ventured out upon the sea of sand; this time to cross or die.”380 
Sandoval contrasts the Nevada Royce faced with today’s Nevada, stating that “we 
can hardly imagine the fear, uncertainty and courage of Sarah, her family, and her 
pioneer brethren.”381 But he also creates a comparison, calling on his fellow Nevadans to 
consider how far they have come over the last four years, concluding, “we, too, are once 
again moving forward, instead of backward.”382 By comparing and contrasting Nevada 
with Royce’s story, Sandoval established an image capable of what Bially Mattern 
                                                 







referred to as representational force, presenting a “do-or-die” command to the state, 
because even though it had had a successful journey to date, the state was now at a place 
where it must also “cross or die.”383 
Moving from Royce and Nevada’s pioneer past, Sandoval points out that his 
mentor, Paul Laxalt, was the first Governor of Nevada to hold inaugural events outside of 
the capitol, as he was doing that day in 2015.384 “Paul Laxalt understood that on days like 
today,” Sandoval said, “the past, present, and future meet on this stage.”385 In 2015, he 
continued in Laxalt’s tradition, not only in where his inauguration was held, but also in 
embracing Nevada’s history, its present, and its future. “And so, in accordance with our 
constitution, and our tradition, we gather again as the Nevada family on this cold winter’s 
day to write another chapter in the story of our state,” he said.386 
The future he was talking about was present on the stage with him, as children 
from all over the state carried out every aspect of the inaugural event. According to the 
governor, those children were not only present to assist with the speeches, songs, prayers, 
and introductions of the event, but they also represented an image of those who will 
“bravely begin the narrative for a future Nevada we can only begin to imagine.”387 The 
remaining four years of his administration would be dedicated to creating a Nevada that 
was worthy of them.388 
His conclusion tied all of his themes together, and reiterated them again, fully 
transitioning the resilience narrative he began with in 2011 to a renewal narrative in 
2015. Over the last four years, Nevada “endured unimaginable human tragedy and natural 
disasters,” but they were renewed because they “dared to dream of a better Nevada; a 
Nevada that can and will compete in the global economy and take its proper place among 
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the great states in the union.”389 To achieve that greatness, the governor said, “We must 
each find in ourselves the grit and determination required to cross the deserts of our 
time.”390 
Sandoval’s next State of the State address was a few weeks later on January 15, 
2015, and he continued to present his vision for a renewed Nevada. Early in his speech, 
he mentioned a time capsule that had been sealed a month before as the conclusion to 
Nevada’s sesquicentennial celebration, the contents of which “capture a snapshot of the 
Nevada family today, to be presented to a 200-year-old Nevada in 2064.”391 Sandoval 
stated that in sealing the capsule he “realized that the success or failure of the governor 
and people of Nevada in 2064 will largely depend on our decisions today.”392 
By beginning his speech this way, Sandoval was able to continue the “do-or-die” 
proposition he established in his inaugural address by framing his state as at a crossroads. 
Together, they would begin to write the next chapter of Nevada’s story, as he had also 
said before, and he hoped they would collectively choose to invest in Nevada’s future.393 
Since they had successfully weathered extreme economic times, he expanded his renewal 
narrative by claiming that he believed they stood “at the threshold of a New Nevada,” a 
phrase that indicated he aimed to continue his themes of shared sacrifice, common 
purpose, and optimism.394 
These three themes culminated in a comprehensive plan to transform education 
within the state. He proposed shared sacrifice by changing the tax structure to generate 
more revenue, changing the government and accountability structures for the state’s 
education system, and investing in new programs to ensure the future success for an 
education system that had been struggling for years.395 He again called on the lawmakers 
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to eschew partisanship and work towards his vision.396 He also argued that investing in 
education would be the bold decision they could all make to create the Nevada that he 
envisioned for the children who would inherit the New Nevada.397 
Appropriately, the governor’s final State of the State address on January 17, 2017, 
served as a bookend to his initial inaugural address and State of the State address. Largely 
a retrospective of the state’s accomplishments in previous years, the speech served to 
cement the renewal that he had led the state through.398 While the governor discussed the 
economic difficulties of Nevada’s recent past, the pioneers who came before, and the 
need to work for the future, the majority of his speech was committed to the programs 
and investments that he wanted to make on Nevada’s behalf, something that he could not 
have done in any of his previous major addresses because of the state’s dire economic 
straits.399 
The governor’s final speech did not follow an inaugural address, and it lacked 
much of the imagery and flourish of his previous speeches. Three references were made 
to the “new Nevada economy,” but none to the “New Nevada.”400 Also no references 
were made to the “Nevada family.” Nevada’s crisis was over, the state was renewed, just 
as he said it would, through sacrifice, unity, and an undying hope in a better future.401 
Nevada’s hard-won renewal, as reflected in the governor’s address in January 
2017, was broken at about 10:08PM when Stephen Paddock opened fire on the crowd of 
approximately 22,000 concertgoers below his hotel room. The state had endured the 
largest mass shooting in recent U.S. history, and the shock persisted as questions 
remained open in the weeks that followed. The shock and uncertainty created a political 
blame game that followed, with Nevada politicians choosing to act as political crisis 
leaders or political crisis managers based on their level of blame risk. Governor Sandoval 
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chose to be a political crisis leader, and reverted to the resilience narrative he had 
established in his first inaugural address and carried through his major speeches to follow 
to set the foundation for a renewal narrative that would help carry the state through this 
tragic crisis. 
While the sheriff focused his remarks on the facts of the incident, and other 
elected officials offered support for victims and first responders, Governor Sandoval 
invoked powerful images of pain, anger, and healing in his comments following the 
attacks. In his first tweet following the event, the governor noted, “A tragic & heinous act 
of violence has shaken the #Nevada family. Our prayers are w/ the victims & all affected 
by this act of cowardice.” During his first public remarks at a press conference on 
Monday morning following the attack, the governor, visibly moved, offered solace for 
the victims, praised first responders, called for people to donate blood, asked people to 
pray, and offered pride in the way the response was handled. He concluded by saying that 
a lot could be learned from this “cowardly despicable act,” but noted that the unity of all 
Nevada’s leaders on stage with him showed “the Nevada family at its best.”402 
The governor continued these themes in a media interview the same day. The 
article noted that he had visited the scene of the attack before making his remarks, 
possibly explaining why he appeared to be so moved.403 The article concluded by noting 
the governor’s expression of anger and sadness, but adding, “But in any event, Las Vegas 
will be stronger.”404 
Sandoval’s most powerful remarks came during the culminating press conference 
before he introduced the president on October 4. The governor opened his remarks by 
thanking the president, Sheriff Lombardo, all the first responders, the private sector 
entities that had offered support, and the support that he and Las Vegas had received from 
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the country.405 He then stated that he had attended an impromptu vigil in Reno, held to 
honor and remember what Las Vegas had endured. Describing a moment during the vigil, 
he said: 
And at the moment, despite how dark it was, we saw that the greatest 
darkness cannot put out the smallest light, and we collectively felt the first 
pangs of hope. We saw that despite the deep sadness and grief all around 
us, that we are resilient and committed to fight, recover, and begin the 
lengthy process of healing. As Nevadans, we have a strong history of 
pulling together. We are hurt, but we are not broken. We see generosity on 
a scale that is unprecedented in Nevada history. We know that we will 
never forget this horrific event, but we will march forward, as a family, 
giving each other support, comfort, and love. The future will come one 
day at a time. We have a choice as to how we live each day. We must be 
glad, we must be good, and we must be brave, and we will emerge as a 
stronger, kinder, and better state and nation.406  
E. CONCLUSION 
Together, both Sheriff Lombardo and Governor Sandoval showed true political 
crisis leadership following the mass shooting incident in Las Vegas. Through their 
actions, they were able to both govern and avoid much of the blame directed elsewhere. 
This avoidance resulted in their ability, from their perspectives as local and state leaders, 
respectively, to meet the operational objectives during the response and ensure the 
community was able not only to recover but also to envision renewal following these 
events. 
Their success in the immediate aftermath of the incident, especially as contrasted 
with their elected colleagues, should be appreciated, but it may not always be the 
outcome. Crises of any significant magnitude are complex in their very nature, meaning 
that political leaders cannot hope to control all potential aspects or outcomes of the 
events. Even if the models of political crisis leadership presented in this thesis do not 
provide models for absolute success, they provide models for effective leadership for 
elected officials before, during, and after dynamic events. 
                                                 
405 “President Trump Meets First Responders in Las Vegas.”  
406 Ibid. 
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The same can be said for the governor’s development and deployment of 
resilience narratives. In this case, his initial development of the narrative of the grit and 
resolve of the Nevada family, as he termed it, was originally to lay the foundation for 
Nevada’s economic renewal. The fact that it was effective in the context of the improving 
economy ensured that it was established in time to be used again during the tragedy in 
Las Vegas in October 2017.  
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